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THE "PERJURY TRAP"
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN t

"Any experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict
anybody at any time for almost anything before any grand
jury." 1
"Save for torture, it would be hard to find a more effective
tool of tyranny than the power of unlimited and unchecked ex parte examination." 2
Most experienced prosecutors would reject as nonsense the
notion that they could indict anybody at any time for anything
before any grand jury. They would, however, probably concede
that their marksmanship improves when perjury is sought.3 That
is the subject of this Article: the deliberate use of the grand jury
to secure perjured testimony, a practice dubbed by some courts the
"perjury trap." 4
f Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. A.B. 1963, Princeton University;
L.L.B. 1966, New York University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his colleague Professor
Judith Schenck Koffier.
This Article is dedicated to Professor Robert Childres.
I Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972), quoted in
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (identical
dissenting opinion in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 18 (1973)).
2 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1953) (L. Hand, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954).
3 "Perjury" is used in this Article to mean a witness's deliberately false swearing to a material matter in a judicial proceeding, here specifically a grand jury.
Defined as such, six elements are required to prove perjury: (1) an oral statement;
(2) that is false; (3) made under oath; (4) with knowledge of its falsity; (5) in
a judicial proceeding such as a grand jury; (6) to a material matter. This definition
accords with the general perjury statutes in effect in almost every American jurisdiction. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976 & Supp. III
1979); CAL. PEAL CODE § 118 (West 1970); MAss ANN. LAws ch. 268, § 1 (Law.
Co-op 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:131-1 (West 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 210.15
(McKinney 1975). See also MODEL PENAL ConE § 241.1(1) (Prop. Off. Draft,
1962). Similarly, at common law perjury was defined as "a crime committed when
a lawful oath is administered, in some judicial proceeding, to a person who swears
wilfully, absolutely and falsely, in a matter material to the issue or point In question." 4 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTAMS, * 136-37 (emphasis in original).
For discussions of the perjury penalty, see LAw REvIsxoN COMMISSION, STATE
OF NEW Yosu, A STUDy OF PERjuRY 233-343 (Legis. Doc. 60, 1935) [hereinafter
cited as PERJURY REPORT]; MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.20, Comments (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1957); R. PEanNs, CRImNAL LAw 453-66 (2d ed. 1969); 6 J. WimoGRE,
EviDENCE § 1831 (Chadbourn rev. 1976). See also Note, An Analysis of New
York's Perjury Law, 40 ALB. L. REv. 198 (1975).
4 People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 258, 385 N.E.2d 1224, 1228, 413 N.Y.S.2d
295, 299 (1978); People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 99, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (1980).
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Consider the following examples: (1) In the course of a grand
jury probe of official corruption, the prosecutor summons a judge
who is suspected of misconduct. Police surveillance has revealed
that the judge recently held a lengthy conversation in a bar with
a major organized crime figure. The judge is questioned before
the grand jury and denies certain details of the meeting. He is indicted for perjury. (2) During an investigation into loansharking,
law enforcement officials electronically intercept an arguably suspicious telephone conversation and summon one of the parties to
the communication before a grand jury. When questioned by the
prosecutor about the conversation, the witness denies its occurrence.
He is indicted for perjury. (3) A grand jury has been conducting
an inquiry into espionage. A prominent individual is subpoenaed
and questioned about alleged communist activities occurring many
years earlier. Because the statute of limitations has expired, the
witness cannot be prosecuted for any substantive offense. The
witness denies past involvement in communist activities. He is
indicted for perjury.
These examples all embody elements of the prototypical perjury trap. In each case, the prosecutor suspected the witness of
criminal activity and proof existed to bear out that suspicion. None
of the individuals could be prosecuted for a substantive crime
See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 245 F.2d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 1957) ("The purpose to get him indicted for perjury and nothing else is manifest beyond all reasonable doubt."); State v. Redinger, 64 N.J. 41, 50, 312 A.2d 129, 134 (1973)
(witness "was allowed to walk into a waiting charge of perjury"); People v. Brust,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2, 1976, at 12, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.) ("a calculated effort to develop
and preserve perjury counts").
This author's experience both as a prosecutor and defense attorney leads him
to conclude that some prosecutors routinely question witnesses in the grand jury
with the deliberate design of "setting up" the witness for a perjury charge. For
example, a recent decision by a New York appellate court alluded to an interoffice
memorandum of the Organized Crime Section of the New York Police Department
that stated: "The strategy of this investigation is to use the 'Grand Jury' approach,
that is to obtain 'hard-fast' information on persons prominent in the investigation,
serve them with Grand Jury subpoenas, grant them limited immunity to particular
facts and attempt to make contempt and perjury cases against them." People v.
DeMartino, 71 A.D.2d 477, 486, 422 N.Y.S.2d 949, 956 (1979).
Reporting on the difficulty of perjury prosecutions, a seminal report on crime
in the United States observed: "The present special proof requirements in perjury
cases [the "two-witness" rule, see note 10 infra] inhibit prosecutors from seeking
perury indictments and lead to much lower conviction rates for perjury than for
other crimes." PRESIDEMS CoNOMnssIoN ON LAw ENFORCEMrNT AND ADmn-sTRA'noN
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(1967)

(emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as PRESmENT'S REPORT].
The possibility that prosecutors might summon witnesses into grand juries with
the premeditated purpose of obtaining perjured testimony was commented on by the
drafters of the Model Penal Code: "There is disturbing opportunity for abuse in
conducting inquiries into ancient misdeeds of the witness, with the object of
eliciting a denial that can then be charged as perjury .... " MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 208.20, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).

626

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12.9:624

either because insufficient proof existed or because of a legal bar.6
Sufficient evidence existed to prove false the witnesses' denials.
The witnesses were prominent or notorious persons against whom
an indictment for perjury would invite public approval as well as
demonstrate effective law enforcement." In each case, it could be
argued that the prosecutor, frustrated at his inability to indict the
suspect witness for a substantive crime, purposefully sought to induce the witness to testify in a manner that the prosecutor knew
could be contradicted by sufficient independent evidence, thereby
subjecting the witness to prosecution for perjury. In other words,
as a hypothetical prosecutor might candidly acknowledge: "If we
can't get him for a real crime, we'll get him for perjury." 7
Strangely, while a myriad of claimed grand jury abuses and
correlative proposals for reform have received wide attention,8 the
perjury trap has largely escaped comment or criticism. This is
puzzling for a number of reasons. First, any discussion of the
perjury trap raises disturbing questions of arguably constitutional
magnitude. The prosecutor's use of the grand jury, not to uncover antecedent crime, but to cause perjury to be committed, implicates fundamental notions of fairness. The awesome powers of
investigating grand juries, the limited rights of witnesses, the secrecy of the interrogation, and the harsh intolerance of perjured
5 Of course, a prosecutor ordinarily will prefer obtaining a conviction for a
substantive offense to obtaining a perjury conviction. Substantive convictions may
well carry greater criminal penalties than perjury convictions, and may result in
greater popular and professional approval. Thus, the perjury trap will be most
appealing to the prosecutor only when he or she is unable, or unlikely, to obtain a
substantive conviction. See note 11 infra.
6
In such cases the prosecutor has powerful incentives to obtain the conviction
of the particular individual for any offense, rather than the conviction of anyone
for a particular substantive offense. See note 5 supra.
7
1n the three foregoing examples, a perjury trap was found in the first case,
People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 385 N.E.2d 1224, 413 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1978), no
perjury trap was found in the second case, United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d
178 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976), and the issue was neither
raised nor considered in the third, United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951).
5
Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Grand Jury Reform]; ABA SEcTioiq
OF CRIMINAL JUsTIcE, PoLIcY ON THE GRmnsn Jusiy (1977); Antell, The Modem
Grand Jury: Beknighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A. J. 153 (1965); Johnston,
The Grand Jury-ProsecutorialAbuse of the Indictment Process, 65 J. Cms. L. & C.
157 (1974); Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55
CoL M. L. Rsv. 1103 (1955); Newman, The Suspect and the Grand Jury: A Need
for Constitutional Protection, 11 RIcH. L. REv. 1 (1976); Rodis, A Lawyers Guide
to Grand Jury Abuse, 14 Crum. L. BULL. 123 (1978); Shannon, Grand Jury: True
Tribunal of the People or Administrative Agency of the Prosecutor?, 2 N.M. L.
REv. 141 (1972); Tigar & Levy, The Grand Jury as the New Inquisition, 50 MbcH.
ST. B.J. 693 (1971).
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testimony, all provide a natural setting for oppression and deceit.
In such circumstances, the protections offered by the due process
clause seem especially appropriate, and perhaps necessary. 9
Second, the occasion for a prosecutor to utilize the perjury
penalty may be greater today than ever before. This is particularly
true in areas of white collar, organized, and official crime, as is
evidenced, for example, by the remarkable increase in the incidence
of perjury prosecutions since the passage of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970.10 Third, because of the inherently difficult
9 Over the past eight years the Supreme Court has decided seven cases dealing
specifically with the powers of grand juries and the rights of witnesses summoned
before such bodies. In every case, the Court has reaffirmed the grand jury's vast
inquisitory powers and the inapplicability of constitutional safeguards to witnesses.
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977) (grand jury witness need not be
warned prior to testifying that he is potential defendant and subsequent testimony
can be used against him); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977) (failure
to advise grand jury witness of right to remain silent no bar to perjury prosecution
for giving false testimony); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (failure to advise grand jury witness of right to remain silent
and right to counsel no bar to perjury prosecution for giving false testimony);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury witness had no right
to refuse to answer questions that were based on illegally obtained evidence);
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (witness may be compelled to furnish
grand jury with samples of his handwriting); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1
(1973) (witness may be compelled to furnish grand jury with recording of his
voice); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (newspaper reporter has no constitutional right to refuse to answer questions before grand jury).
The Supreme Court's broad support of the grand jury is in stark contrast to
the fears expressed by many that the grand jury is a law enforcement tool used to
oppress citizens. See authorities cited note 8 supra. On the dangers of ex parte
interrogation, Justice Black observed:
Secret inquisitions are dangerous things justly feared by free men
everywhere. They are the breeding place for arbitrary misuse of official
power. They are often the beginning of tyranny as well as indispensable
instruments for its survival. Modem as well as ancient history bears witness that both innocent and guilty have been seized by officers of the
state and whisked away for secret interrogation or worse until the groundwork has been securely laid for their inevitable conviction. While the
labels applied to this practice have frequently changed, the central idea
vherever and whenever carried out remains unchanging-extraction of
"statements" by one means or another from an individual by officers of the
state while he is held incommunicado. I reiterate my belief that it violates the Due Process Clause to compel a person to answer questions at a
secret interrogation where he is denied legal assistance and where he is
subject to the uncontrolled and invisible exercise of power by government officials. Such procedures are a grave threat to the liberties of a
free people.
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 352-53 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
10 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 28, 29, 33, 42,
45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 50 App. U.S.C.), was enacted in response to the report by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice contending, inter alia, that law enforcement lacked sufficient resources, coordination,
and public and political commitment to deal comprehensively with organized crime.
Pansnomr's REpORT, supra note 4, at 198-200. With respect to perjury, the Coin-
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task of proving substantive violations in the area of organized crime
and official corruption, a prosecutor may be encouraged to lure
into perjury persons suspected of wrongdoing who might otherwise escape prosecution.'1 Finally, the perjury trap is not merely
mission concluded that the present sanction was not sufficiently effective as a
deterrent. "Lessening of rigid proof requirements in perjury prosecutions would
strengthen the deterrent value of perjury laws and present a greater incentive for
truthful testimony." Id. 201. As a result, Congress included in the Organized Crime
Control Act a new perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976 & Supp. III 1979),
which, according to the committee sponsoring the law, "will not be circumscribed
by rigid common law rules of evidence" and "will offer greater assurance that testimony obtained in grand jury and court proceedings will aid the cause of truth."
See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT]. This statute, entitled "False Declarations Before Grand Jury or Court,"
provides that whoever knowingly and materially falsely swears before any court
or grand jury is punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.
Under traditional proof requirements in perjury cases, two witnesses or one witness plus corroboration was necessary. See Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606
(1945); Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620 (1926); Comment, Proof of Periury:
However, under
The Two Witness Requirement, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 86 (1961).
the new federal perjury statute, no particular number of witnesses or special kinds
of proof is necessary for conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e). The constitutionality of
this statute has been upheld over attacks based on the lessened proof requirements.
See United States v. Camporeale, 515 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1975); United States
v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 1973).
In the five years preceding the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 in 1970, 348 perjury prosecutions were brought by the United States Department of Justice. In
the eight years following passage of the new perjury statute, the number of perMoreover, during the same eight-year period, the
jury prosecutions tripled.
number of perjury prosecutions (1,516) exceeded the number of prosecutions for all
crimes commonly associated with organized crime and official corruption except
anti-racketeering (1,786), with bribery (1,216), anti-gambling (1,187), extortion
(94) and contempt (511) following. See [1978] ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 74-75;
[1977] At-r'y GEN. ANN. REP. 94-95; [1976] ATF'T GEN. ANN. REP. 74-75; [1975]
ATr'y GEN. ANN. REtP. 17-20; [1974] Aarr'v GEN'. ANN. REP. 12-13; [1973] ATr'Y
GEN. ANN. REP. 10-11; [1972] Arr'y. GEN. ANN. REP. 18-19; [1971] Ar'vy GENs.
ANN.

REP. 16-17.
Similarly, state prosecutors rely heavily on perjury prosecutions, particularly in

the areas of organized crime and corruption.

See, e.g., SPECIAL STATE
5, 22, 28 (1979).

PROSECUTOR,

STATE OF NEW YORK, ANNUAL P ocasss REPORT

11 The difficulty of proving substantive violations in the areas of organized
crime, see PRismET's REPORT, supra note 4, at 198-99, applies with equal force
to investigations into white collar crime and official corruption. In these areas,
there are ordinarily no complaining victims or eyewitnesses, and the criminal activity is characterized by clandestine and sophisticated behavior, with the parties
usually in mutual agreement. Moreover, there is unlikely to be any proof of
criminality such as instrumentalities of crime, contraband, or other visible evidence
upon which law enforcement ordinarily relies. Accordingly, when faced with
uncooperative and recalcitrant witnesses in the grand jury, a prosecutor might
understandably rely heavily on the perjury penalty to facilitate an effective
investigation.

Even when accomplices to crime are willing to cooperate with the government,
some jurisdictions, such as New York, have special evidentiary rules requiring independent corroboration of the accomplice's testimony before a conviction for a
substantive offense may be obtained. See N.Y. CRmm. PRoc. LAw § 60.22 (McKinney 1971). However, corroborative proof of the accomplice's testimony is not
required to charge a defendant with perjury based on testimony inconsistent with
that given by the accomplices. See People v. McAuliffe, 36 N.Y.2d 820, 331 N.E.2d
681, 370 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1975) (per curiam).

19811

THE "PERJURY TRAP"

of abstract or theoretical significance. Recently in New York,
perjury charges against two judges, 12 two prominent lawyers,' 3 and
the leader of the State Assembly 4 were dismissed because the
prosecutors' purpose was to trap the defendants into giving false
testimony.
Although courts have frequently suggested that it is impermissible for a prosecutor to deliberately trap a witness into perjury, 15
this principle has not been closely analyzed. In particular, it is
A prosecutor's use of perjury as a subterfuge when he or she is unable to
prove the substantive offense is disquieting for other reasons. A prosecutor who
cannot obtain sufficient evidence of substantive violations against a notorious member of organized crime or a high public official suspected of corruption may
consider it justifiable to subject those individuals to prosecutions for other crimes
such as tax evasion and traffic offenses as well as perjury. It has been argued
that the exercise by a prosecutor of such arbitrary discretion is "the very antithesis
of a rule of law, and a serious violation of his professional responsibility." Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 3 CWn . L. Buim.
544, 546 (1967). See Annot., 45 A.L.R. FED. 732 (1979). Cases that have found
prosecutorial discrimination include United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th
Cir. 1972) (federal census violation); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074
(4th Cir. 1972) (prosecution for disruptive behavior on federal property). See
also United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (selective service violation). But see United States v. Palermo, 152 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
Finally, the incidence of well-known perjury prosecutions in the early 1950s
for denials of communist affiliation, particularly when the prosecutor could not
have charged substantive violations because of the passage of the statute of limitations, is deeply disturbing in that it readily suggests an inquisitorial purpose to
seek perjury when no other charge is available. See United States v. Lattimore,
215 F.2d 847, 862-69 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Edgerton, J., concurring); United States
v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951). One
commentator stated: "[T]oday there is an ominous use of perjury indictments
against persons who have allegedly lied about acts barred from prosecution by
the statutes of limitations." Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A
Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 650 (1954). There are
also first amendment implications in this practice, as Professor Zechariah Chafee
pointed out:
I am disturbed by the growing use of perjury prosecutions to bypass the
Statute of Limitations. One of the main purposes of this statute is to
protect innocent persons who might not be able to defend themselves
against a charge of an antiquated crime, because of the difficulty of digging up recollections and documents about events a dozen years old,
especially when they seemed of no importance at the time. Getting a
man prosecuted for perjury if the grand jury happens to disagree with his
memory of events long buried appears to be legally valid but it is
nothing to be proud of.
Z. CHAFEE, Tmwr-F=r YEAns WiTH FREEDoM oF SPEECH 28-29 (1952).
12 People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 385 N.E.2d 1224, 413 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1978);
People v. Brust, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 2, 1976, at 12, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.).
13People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1980); People v.
Monaghan, N.Y.L.., Nov. 14, 1975, at 8-10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 55 A.D.2d
1056, 391 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1977).
14People v. Blumenthal, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 16, 1976, at 7-8, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 13, 389 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1976), appeal denied, 41 N.Y.2d 1011,
395 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1977).
'5 United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 185 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 935 (1976); United States v. Devitt, 499 F.2d 135, 140 (7th Cir. 1974),
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necessary to examine the theoretical basis of the principle: Is the
perjury trap a subspecies of entrapment in the traditional sense?
Absent a firm theoretical foundation, application of the prohibition
against perjury traps will continue to be imprecise and ad hoc.
The entrapment defense, already confused, will become even more
uncertain when invoked to excuse perjury.
Plainly, the subject demands careful analysis. It is the aim of
the present Article, first, to explore the boundaries of legitimate
grand jury interrogation as it bears on the subject of perjury and,
second, to formulate guidelines that strike a balance between the
needs of the investigatory process and the rights of witnesses.
I. THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERJURY TRAP
A. The InvestigatingGrand Jury
The grand jury occupies a special role in the criminal justice
system.'
Commonly described as 'part of the judicial proccert. denied,

421 U.S. 975 (1975); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1080
(9th Cir. 1972); LaRocca v. United States, 337 F.2d 39, 42-43 (8th Cir. 1964);
Masinia v. United States, 296 F.2d 871, 877 (8th Cir. 1961); Brown v. United
States, 245 F.2d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 1957); Commonwealth v. Borans, Mass. Adv.
Sh. (1979) 2349 (Sept. 4, 1979) (citing People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d 240,
385 N.E.2d 1218, 413 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1978)).
Cf. United States v. Jacobs, 547
F.2d 772, 775 (2d Cir. 1976) (court's supervisory power exercised to dismiss
perjury indictment); United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303, 309 (D.D.C. 1959)
(perjury before Senate committee); United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383, 388
(D.D.C. 1956) (perjury before congressional subcommittee).
16United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
The Constitution
provides that "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
There are basically two types of grand juries. The "indicting grand jury"
hears evidence concerning a specific crime and decides whether the evidence is
sufficient to indict for that crime. The "investigating grand jury" inquires into
general areas of crime with the objective of uncovering evidence to charge crime.
The statutes generally do not distinguish between the two functions and can accommodate both. See N.Y. CIUM. Paoc. LAw § 190.05 (McKinney 1971) ("the functions [of the grand jury] are to hear and examine evidence concerning offenses
and concerning misconduct, nonfeasance and neglect in public office").
The indicting grand jury has been criticized as a "rubber stamp" of the prosecutor. The chairman of the congressional subcommittee that held hearings in 1977
on grand jury problems stated: "All of our witnesses last session conceded that in
95 percent of the cases, the grand jury merely ratifies the decision of the Government attorney to prosecute or not to prosecute."
Grand Jury Reform, supra
note 8, at 2. The subcommittee proposed a constitutional amendment that would
eliminate the indicting grand jury and replace it with a prosecutor's information
stating the essential facts of the crime charged. Id. 999-1000.
The investigating grand jury, on the other hand, is considered a powerful law
enforcement weapon in the areas of organized crime and official corruption. See
SENATE REPoRT, supra note 10, at 47-48; PRsiDErN's REPORT, supra note 4, at
200. Special grand juries have been authorized in recent years specifically for the
purpose of investigating organized crime and official corruption. See 18 U.S.C.
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ess," 17 or "an arm of the court," "I the grand jury is one of the most
powerful instruments in the arsenal of law enforcement. 19 Historically the grand jury was the accuser of the guilty and protector
of the innocent, 20 but today there seems to be an unmistakable
§3331 (1976)

(enacted to "[strengthen] the Federal grand jury system to deal

with organized crime,"

SENATE REPORT,

supra note 10, at 48); N.Y. Code of Rules

and Regulations tit. 9, §§ 1.55-.59 (1972) (executive order of the Governor of the
State of New York authorizing the impaneling of special grand juries to investigate
corruption in New York City). The proposed constitutional amendment discussed
above, while abolishing the indicting grand jury, would retain the investigating grand
jury.
Although indictment by a grand jury is not required by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to be afforded state criminal defendants, Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), every state authorizes the grand jury either as a
required procedure for initiating a criminal prosecution or "as an investigative tooL"
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972).
This Article deals solely with the work of investigating grand juries. Of
course, procedural due process issues may also be implicated in the setting
of an indicting grand jury. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d
584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978). The ex parte interrogation of
witnesses with the objective of uncovering antecedent crime, however-the context in which the perjury trap occurs-involves almost exclusively the investigatory
function of the grand jury, rather than the relatively formalistic indicting function.
17 Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940).

IsLevine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617 (1960);

SENATE REPoRT,

supra

note 10, at 47-51 (proposing, inter alia, a "Special Grand Jury' to investigate
organized crime); M. FRANEEL & G. NAFrTmis, THE GRAND JUmY 20 (1977). A
grand jury investigation has been characterized as "a judicial inquiry." Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66 (1906).
19 The grand jury has been referred to as "a prosecutorial agency." United
States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1153 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 441 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971); accord, United States v. Cleary,
265 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959) (grand jury, "a
law enforcement agency"). The grand jury, "a powerful instrument" with an
"awesome range of powers," "investigates only those whom the prosecutor asks to
be investigated, and by and large indicts those whom the prosecutor wants to be
indicted." M. FRANKEL & G. NA-aTAis, supra note 18, at 4-5, 100. Justice Douglas wrote: "It is, indeed, common knowledge that the grand jury, having been
conceived as a bulwark between the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of
the Executive." United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (identical dissenting opinion rendered in United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 18 (1973)). A prosecutor cannot compel the attendance of witnesses; a
grand jury can. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972). A prosecutor cannot compel the production of documents; a grand jury can. Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). A prosecutor cannot compel testimony; a grand jury
can. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976). Moreover, the
grand jury proceeding is conducted in secret, without the supervision of a judge.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273 (1919).
20 The grand jury originated in England in 1166 when King Henry II's Assize
of Clarendon established a Grand Assize composed of local gentry to investigate
for the King and enforce his law against the Church and the feudal barons. Five
hundred years later, in the College and Shaftsbury cases, the grand jury asserted its
role as a shield against oppressive prosecution. For a history of the grand jury,
I.LA
305-24 (1836); 1
see J. Cmm, A PRACTiCAL TRRAT=SE ON THE CaniNAL
W. HoLDswoRTH, HIsToRY OF ENriSH LAW 321-23 (7th rev. ed. 1956); 1 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAiTLAND, THm I-hsToRY OF ENGaLISH LAW 151 (2d ed. 1909).
For a history of the grand jury in America, see R. YouNGEm, THE PEoPIM's PANEL,
TME GAM JURY IN =r UNITED STATEs 1634-1941 (1963).
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emphasis on ex parte investigation and accusation as opposed to
exoneration. 21 This may be due in large measure to the close relationship between the grand jury and the prosecutor-theoretically
its "legal advisor," 2-the understandable dependence upon the
23 and the
prosecutor by the grand jury for its successful operation,
24
natural impulse of any investigating agency to accuse.
The extraordinary breadth of the grand jury's investigative
powers has been consistently reaffirmed. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly characterized the grand jury as "a grand inquest, a body
with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or
forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts
21 See Note, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedure and Problems, 9 CoLum.
J.L. & Soc. PnoB. 681 (1973); Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body,
74 HARv. L. REv. 590 (1961). Plainly, the claimed necessity for and the actual
empanelment of special investigating grand juries, see note 16 supra, would indicate a public interest in vigorous investigation of crime.
22
See N.Y. Cmmr. Thoc. LAw §190.25(6) (McKinney 1971). The U.S.
Attorneys' Advisory Committee recently opposed recording prosecutorial comments
to the grand jury, claiming that such a procedure would "formalize what should
be an informal working relationship between grand jurors and government attorneys." Grand Jury Reform, supra note 8, at 193.
23
Courts and commentators invariably observe that "the grand jury summoned
the witness," "the grand jury questioned the witness," "the grand jury indicted the
defendant" Technically this is accurate, although in reality it is a distortion. The
grand jury is in many ways a legal fiction, clothing with respectability, neutrality
and independence what are in truth the actions of the prosecutor.
An excellent study of the grand jury by a former federal jurist and a former
federal prosecutor states:
The show is run by the prosecutors

....

The prosecutors decide what is

to be investigated, who will be brought before the grand jurors, andpractically and generally spealdng-who should be indicted for what....
Day in and day out, the grand jury affirms what the prosecutor calls
upon it to affirm-investigating as it is led, ignoring what it is never
advised to notice, failing to indict or indicting as the prosecutor 'submits'
that it should. Not surprisingly, the somewhat technical, somewhat complex, occasionally arcane language of indictments is drafted by the prosecutor and handed to the grand jury foreman or forelady for the signature
which is almost invariably affixed.
It could not more than rarely be otherwise. In a busy, densely populated, elaborately organized society-where crime is rife, criminals are
tough, many wrongs are mysterious and concealed from laymen-law enforcement is inescapably for professionals. The very notion of the grand
jury as beneficent for a free society would be subverted by a band of
amateurs engaged in sleuthing, summoning, indicting, or not indicting as
their 'independent' and untutored judgment might dictate. Privacy,
security, and reputation would be in steady jeopardy. Sophisticated criminals would be safe; innocent citizens would be less safe.
M. FnAmEL & G. NAaTAr~is, supra note 18, at 21-23.
24
Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HAav. L. REv. 590,

594 (1961).
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whether any particular individual will be found properly subject
to an accusation of crime." 2
In accord with the oft-stated principle that "the public has a
right to every man's evidence," 28 this modem inquisitorial body is
empowered to summon any person before it and, subject to modest
constraints imposed by the fourth27 and fifth 28 amendments, to
compel that person to disclose under oath everything he or she
knows about the matter under inquiry.2 9 "[T]he witness is bound
25Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). See United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688
(1972).
2
6United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). Since Chief Justice
Marshall's famous decision nearly two centuries ago in United States v. Burr, 25
F. Cas. 38 (C.C.D. Va. 1807), this principle has been "long accepted in America
as a hornbook proposition." United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976).
27The fourth amendment limits the scope of a grand jury subpoena for documents to information that is reasonably related to the grand jury's investigation.
See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (dictum); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
See also In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 867 (1973), in which it was suggested that restrictions on overbroad subpoenas derive not from the fourth amendment but from the due process clause.
However, challenging a subpoena on grounds of overbreadth is obviously difficult in view of the wide latitude accorded investigating grand juries to probe for
information "in order to determine the question whether the facts show a case
within [the grand jury's] jurisdiction." Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 283
(1919).
An indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that
evidence supporting the charges was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45 (1974). Similarly, a
witness is required to respond to questions concededly predicated on evidence
obtained in violation of his or her fourth amendment rights. Id. 350.
28The fifth amendments guarantee against self-incrimination often figures
prominently in protecting grand jury witnesses. United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564 (1976); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). However, the
privilege may properly be overridden by a grant of immunity. Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115
(1980). See note 91 infra.
As in the case of the fourth amendment, an indictment is not subject to attack
even though the evidence supporting the charge was obtained in violation of the
fifth amendment. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958). Similarly, a
witness may not avoid answering a question on the grounds that it is predicated
on information obtained in violation of the fifth amendment. United States v.
Weir, 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1974).
29United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
"Probing questions
to all types of witnesses is the stuff that grand jury investigations are made of .
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 573 (1976).
A grand jury cannot literally compel a recalcitrant witness to testify. However, the contempt power permits a court to impose penal sanctions upon a witness
who refuses to testify. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964);
R. GOLDFAIB, THE CONTEMPT PowER 105-14 (1963); Note, Coercive Contempt
and the Federal Grand Jury, 79 CoLum. L. REv. 735 (1979). The contempt power
of courts and the attendant procedures are defined by statute. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§401 (1976); NJ. STAT. ANN. §2A:10-1-2A:10-7 (West 1952 & Supp. 1980);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§215.50, 215.51 (McKinney 1975).
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not only to attend but to tell what he knows in answer to questions
framed for the purpose of bringing out the truth of the matter
under inquiry." 30 Moreover, as a general rule, a witness may
not challenge the questions as incompetent or irrelevant nor object
that the grand jury is exceeding its authority, "for this is no concern of [the witness]," his role being simply to testify truthfully to
what he knows.31
It is thus not surprising that the rights of witnesses, when
balanced against the broad powers of the grand jury, are severely
attenuated. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have done
little to alter this balance of power 32 In 1976, for example, the
Court held that a witness has no right to remain silent before a
grand jury but, rather, "has an absolute duty to answer all questions, subject only to a valid Fifth Amendment claim." 33 The
prosecutor, however, has no obligation to advise the witness of his
fifth amendment right.34 Similarly, there is no requirement to
warn the witness of his duty to tell the truth or, conversely, of the
dangers of testifying falsely.3 5 Nor does a grand jury witness have
The sanctions of perjury and contempt have the common purpose of forcing
witnesses to give truthful testimony. While this Article deals with the case of a
prosecutor abusing the perjury sanction, it has been suggested that the contempt
sanction could be similarly abused by a prosecutor who deliberately traps a witness into committing contempt. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959); People
v. Rappaport, 47 N.Y.2d 308, 391 N.E.2d 1284, 418 N.Y.S.2d 306, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 964 (1979); People v. Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d 232, 385 N.E.2d 1214,
413 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1978).
3
0 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
31 Id. "[The witness] is not entitled to urge objections of incompetency or
irrelevancy .. . . [Hie is not entitled to challenge the authority of the court or
of the grand jury ....
He is not entitled to set limits to the investigation that
the grand jury may conduct." See also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,
362 (1956) (indictment valid on its face not subject to challenge on the ground
that grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence). But
see United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.).
32 See cases cited in note 9 supra.
33 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) (plurality opinion).
The fifth amendment privilege historically has been available to a grand jury witness. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
34 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 580 (1976); United States v.
Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 181 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976);
United States v. DiMichele, 375 F.2d 959, 960 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
838 (1967). In Manduiano, the Supreme Court observed that any warning given
to a grand jury witness of an absolute right to silence "obviously . . - would be
incorrect, for there is no such right before a grand jury." 425 U.S. at 580. The
Court declined to determine whether a grand jury witness must be warned of his
fifth amendment right against self incrimination. Id. 582 n.7. However, the tenor
of recent Supreme Court decisions delineating the rights of grand jury witnesses
suggests that no such warning would be mandated, particularly when the witness has
perjured himself.
35United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581-82 (1976).
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a right to the assistance of counsel inside the grand jury room. 38
Finally, persons implicated in criminal activity and even those
"targeted" for prosecution are required to appear and testify before the grand jury.8 7 Indeed, such "putative defendants" have no
right to a warning regarding their perilous situation.38
36 Id. 581. The question whether a grand jury witness has a right to counsel
inside the grand jury room has generated considerable debate. In Manduiano, a
plurality of four Justices took the view that "[n]o criminal proceedings had been
instituted against respondent, hence the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not
come into play," id. 581; two Justices took the position that such a right exists
(Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., concurring); the other two Justices deciding the
case took no position on this issue (Stewart, J. and Blaclaun, J., concurring).
(Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.) The
federal jurisdictions and most states do not permit counsel inside the jury room,
although they generally permit the witness to leave the grand jury room to consult
with counsel prior to answering any given question. Id. 606-07, n.23 (Brennan,
J., concurring). This practice is not absolute, however. See In re Tierney, 465
F.2d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1972) (denial of consultation upheld "to prevent a breakdown in the grand jury proceedings by frequent departures from the grand jury
room for frivolous reasons and with intent to frustrate the proceedings"); People
v. Ward, 37 A.D.2d 174, 177, 323 N.Y.S.2d 316, 319 (1971) ("no right to consultation in the midst of grand jury testimony for mere strategic advice").
Presently, thirteen states allow counsel to be present inside the grand jury
room under varying circumstances. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. vol. 17, § 12.5
(West 1973) (for witnesses under investigation); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-5-204
(1978) (no limitation); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-4.1 (Smith-Hurd 1980)
(for witnesses against whom indictment is being sought); K.N. STAT. ANN. § 223009 (1974) (no limitation); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 277, § 14A (Law. Co-op
1980) (no limitation); MICH. Com-e. LAws ANN. § 767.3 (1968) (no limitation);
MnqN. STAT. ANN. vol. 49, § 18.04 (West 1976) (if witness waives immunity);
N.Y. Crwm. PRoc. LAw § 190.45 (McKinney 1971) (if witness waives immunity);
OmxA
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 340 (West 1971 & Supp. 1979) (no limitation);
S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 23A-5-11 (1970) (no limitation); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-19-3 (Smith Allen 1978) (no limitation); VA. CODE § 19.2-209 (Michie
1975) (only before special grand jury); WAsH. BEv. CODE ANN. § 10.27.080
(West Supp. 1979) (no limitation).
The American Law Institute supports counsel in the grand jury room, see
MODEL CODE OF PE-ARRmAGNmENT PROCEDURE § 5340.3(1) (Prop. Off. Draft,
1975), as does the American Bar Association. See ABA SECTION OF CnRMNAL
JUsTICE, Report No. 115 (1977). A bill before Congress would authorize the
presence of counsel in the grand jury room. See H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977), reprinted in Grand Jury Reform, supra note 8, at 982-83.
Commentators generally favor counsel in the grand jury room. See Dash, The
Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 Am. Cram. L. REv. 807 (1972); Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189 (1966); Newman,
supra note 8; Note, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 D=n
L.T. 97. But see Silbert, Defense Counsel in the Grand Jury-The Answer to the
White Collar Criminal's Prayers, 15 Am. CiRi. L. REV. 293 (1978).
37United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 179 n.8 (1977); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1973).
38United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
The American Bar
Association has favored a rule requiring a prosecutor to advise a witness that he may
be a potential defendant. Section 3.6(d) of the ABA's standards relating to the
prosecution function provides: "If the prosecutor believes that a witness is a potential defendant he should not seek to compel his testimony before the grand
jury without informing him that he may be charged and that he should seek independent legal advice concerning his rights." ABA, PROJECT ON ST'A-m s FOR
CRuv4IAL JUsTICE, STANDARDS RElMATMNG TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTnoN §3.6(d)
(App. Draft, 1971).
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B. The Crime of Perjury
Perjury has always been considered one of the most odious
crimes in our law. Hawkins said that perjury 'is of all Crimes
whatsoever the most Infamous and Detestable." "
Sir James
Stephen noted that "[w]hoever gives false evidence must be thrown
from the Tarpeian rock." 40 Under the Code of Hammurabi,
the Roman law, and the French law, death was the punishment
for bearing false witness. 41 In the colony of New York, punishment
42
included branding the letter "P" on the offender's forehead.
The courts today refer to "the pollution of perjury." 43 Chief
Justice Burger recently said, "Perjured testimony is an obvious and
flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. Effective restraints against this type of egregious offense are therefore
imperative." 4
That perjury should be viewed with such outrage is not surprising. False testimony seriously threatens the fair and effective
administration of justice. An individual's life, liberty, or property
may be lost because of perjured testimony. 45 Similarly, the protection of the public may be undermined by perjury. In particular,
crimes relating to corruption of public officials, such as bribery,
extortion, and obstruction of justice, may be shielded from detection
by perjured testimony. 46 Moreover, because of the requirement
of an oath, perjury retains a sacrilegious character. Penal sanctions
provide temporal punishment; violating an oath suggests ultimate
39 1 W. HAWKINs, A TREATIsE OF TnE PLEAs OF THE CnoWN 172 (1724).

401 J.F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CnmiNAL LAW OF ENGLAND 11 (1883).
41 See PERjURY REPORT, sup-ra note 3, at 251-53. See also S. Boe, LYING:
MORAL CHOICE iN PUBLIc AND PRaVATE LnF 160 (1978).
42
LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEw YORK (I COLONIAL LAWS OF NEw Yonr,

1664-1719, ch. 8, 129), entitled "An Act to prevent willful Perjury."

43
Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 357 (1973); United States v.
Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 68 (1951); United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297, 302 (3d

Cir. 1954).
44

United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976).

45 United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937)

("Perjury is an obstruc-

tion of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties
before a tribunal."). Convictions based on perjured testimony violate due process.
See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264

(1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).

See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R.

3d 1153 (1967).
46 See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 933 (1977); United States v. Beitling, 545 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied 430 U.S. 918 (1977); United States v. Sisack, 527 F.2d 917 (9th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ruggiero, 472
F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965).
See also PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 4, at 200-01.
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punishment by a supernatural power.4 7 The "solemnity of the
oath" 48 is graphically illustrated by rule 603 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence: "Before testifying, every witness shall be required to
declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so." 49
Perjury is considered so inimical to the fair administration of
justice that the detection and prosecution of perjurers has largely
outweighed their rights. Thus, the failure of the government to
warn a witness of his constitutional rights does not thereby preclude
prosecution for subsequent false testimony.5 0 Moreover, although
the government compels an individual to answer improper questions, or compels answers that would violate the individual's constitutional rights, prosecution for false answers is nevertheless
permissible. 51 The Supreme Court has stated in this regard: "[I]t
47 It has been said that "[tlhe oath remains an icon in the law."
Note, A
Reconsideration of the Sworn Testimony Requirement: Securing Truth in the Twentieth Century, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1681, 1707 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sworn
Testimony Requirement]. This note provides a comprehensive discussion of the
history of the oath and of some current issues relating to the sworn testimony requirement. It also considers whether such a requirement should be uncritically
accepted today. See generally PERjuRY REPoRT, supra note 3, at 233-54; 6 J.
WIG O , EVrIDENCe §§ 1816-1830 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
48United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976).
49
Fs. R. Evm. 603. Rule 603 codifies the traditional "sworn testimony rule."
It has been said that a witness who refuses to take an oath is "not a witness at
all." United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd. on appeal
after remand, 467 F.2d 86 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973). Many jurisdictions bar the admission in evidence of unsworn oral testimony. See Sworn Testimony Requirement, supra note 47, at 1682 n.8.
In order to "enhance the solemnity of the administration of oaths," a major
study of perjury recommended that in addition to the oath, an admonition be
added that false testimony may lead to prosecution for perjury; the posting of a
similar warning "in clear legible type" near the witness stand; requiring that the
witness sign a card upon which is printed the oath "and/or anything else that may
be deemed valuable." PERJRY REPoRT, supra note 3, at 323. However, the
courts have emphatically rejected such supplemental warnings: "Once a witness
swears to give truthful answers, there is no requirement to 'warn him not to commit perjury or, conversely to direct him to tell the truth.' It would render the
sanctity of the oath quite meaningless to require admonition to adhere to it."
United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 1965), quoted in United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581-82 (1976).
50 United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United States v. Mandujano,
425 U.S. 564 (1976). Although the opinion for the Court in Manduiano was by
a plurality, the concurring Justices agreed that "[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination provides no protection for the commission of
perjury." Id. 609. (Stewart, J. and Blackmun, J., concurring). "Although the
Fifth Amendment guaranteed respondent the right to refuse to answer the potentially incriminating questions put to him before the grand jury, in answering falsely
he took 'a course that the Fifth Amendment gave him no privilege to take."' Id.
584-85 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., concurring).
51Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) (even assuming, arguendo, the
unconstitutionality of a statute requiring a non-communist affidavit from union of-
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cannot be thought that as a general principle of our law a citizen
has a privilege to answer fraudulently a question that the Government should not have asked. Our legal system provides methods
for challenging the Government's right to ask questions-lying is
not one of them." 52 Finally, in a series of cases beginning in
1954, the Supreme Court has permitted prosecutors to "flush out"
perjury by using information acquired through illegal means.5 8
C. The Defense of Entrapment
Entrapment is often looked upon with the same repugnance as
is perjury. Words like "lawless," "offensive," "revolting," and
"reprehensible" are used to characterize the actions of law enforcement officials in luring a defendant to commit a crime.54 However,
in contrast with other claims frequently raised to invalidate a
perjury indictment-insufficiency of the evidence,5 5 lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal,5 6 immaterality of the questions 57-entrapment superficially appears to be a most peculiar and tenuous excuse.
ficers for the union to invoke the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board,
defendant's conviction for filing an affidavit falsely denying affiliation with the
Communist Party was proper); United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969) (false
statements contained in wagering tax form subsequently held invalid as infringing
on the fifth amendment no bar to a conviction for filing a false affidavit).
U Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969).
58 United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980) (illegally seized evidence
may be used to impeach credibility); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (statements obtained after Miranda violation admissible to impeach credibility); Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements obtained after defective Miranda
warnings may be used to impeach credibility); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62 (1954) (illegally seized evidence may be used to impeach credibility). But
see New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (testimony given following grant
of immunity may not be used to impeach credibility); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385 (1978)
(involuntary confession may not be used to impeach credibility).
54 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-55 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 522, 378 N.E.2d 78, 84, 406
N.Y.S. 2d 714, 720 (1978). See, e.g., Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the
FederalCourts, 90 U. PA. L. lRv. 245, 263 (1942).
55 Government of Canal Zone v. Thrush, 616 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933
(1977); United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Dippolito, 433 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971); United States v. Fiorillo, 376 F.2d 180 (2d
Cir. 1967).
56 United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951); United States v. Phillips,
540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); United States v.
Sisack, 527 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Macklin, 523 F.2d 193
(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Cuevas, 510 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1975); LaRocca
v. United States, 337 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1964). See Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 1038
(1971).
57United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1037-38 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United
States v. Percell, 526 F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Koonce,
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Under the generally accepted view, the entrapment defense is
available when a law enforcement official originates the idea of the
crime and then induces the defendant, who was not otherwise so
disposed, to commit the offense.58 The courts recognize that law
enforcement officers must employ undercover techniques and deceit
in order to uncover criminal schemes that are difficult to detect5 9
Police and prosecutors, however, may go too far in their use of deception, decoys, and provocation to undercover elusive criminal
activity. Thus, it is permissible for law enforcement officers to
"trap . . the unwary criminal" but not permissible to "trap . . .
the unwary innocent."

60

485 F.2d 374, 380-82 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196,
1198-99 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972); United States v.
Winter, 348 F.2d 204, 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965).
5 8
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOoK ON ClmrnAi, LAw 369-74 (1972);
R. PmRKNs, supra note 3, at 1031-36. This is the rule in the federal courts, as
defined in the four major entrapment decisions of the Supreme Court. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). It is also the rule in all but seven state jurisdictions. See People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 689, 591 P.2d 947, 955, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 459, 467 (1979) (listing the jurisdictions that have rejected the federal
rule); Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MIN. L. REv. 163, 166-69 (1976)
(same).
69 In this connection, the Supreme Court has commented:
In order to obtain convictions for illegally manufacturing drugs, the gathering of evidence of past unlawful conduct frequently proves to be an all
but impossible task. Thus in drug-related offenses law enforcement personnel have turned to one of the only practicable means of detection:
the infiltration of drug rings and a limited participation in their unlawful
present practices. Such infiltration is a recognized and permissible means
of investigation ....
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973).
By the same token, corruption-related offenses such as bribery also logically
lend themselves to undercover law enforcement techniques. See United States v.
Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. DeSapio, 435 F.2d 272,
281-82 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 999 (1971). The much publicized
"ABSCAM" case, in which federal agents apparently posed as Arab businessmen
and allegedly paid bribes to public officials, graphically illustrates the use of creative undercover methods to investigate corruption. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 3,
1980, at Al, col. 1. See generally Hous Comm. oN ST,mAms oF OuIcram CoNDucT, IN rm MATr=SI oF REPREsENTATVE MicHmAE J. MyE-s, H.R. REP. No.
1387, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (2 vols.) (1980).
IGOSherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); Casey v. United
States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). It has been suggested that the term "entrapment" is a misnomer because "[it is not the entrapment of a criminal upon which the law frowns, but the seduction of innocent
people into a criminal career by its officers is what is condemned and will not be
tolerated." People v. Braddock, 41 Cal. 2d 794, 802, 264 P.2d 521, 525 (1953);
. PERKINs, supra note 3, at 1031.
Needless to say, attempts to differentiate between an "unwary criminal" and
an "unwary innocent" lead to confusion. In both cases, "[the defendant's] conduct
includes all the elements necessary to constitute criminality" and "is not less criminal because of the result of temptation." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,
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The entrapment defense has been the source of considerable
confusion and controversy, 61 but one can isolate three distinct
doctrinal positions. The central issue has always been whether the
focus of the defense should be on the character of the victim of the
trap-a subjective test-or, alternatively, on the methods used by
the government to lure the victim into the commission of crimean objective test. 62 Apart from the subjective and objective approaches, some courts have applied due process doctrines in connection with the entrapment defense.6 3
The Supreme Court, although sharply divided over the proper
formulation of the entrapment defense,6 4 has consistently embraced
the subjective position. The majority views the test to be "whether
the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Govern379-80 (1958)

(Frankfurter, J., concurring).

See also Mikell, supra note 54, at

245, 252-56. Moreover, such a dichotomy has serious evidentiary consequences for
a defendant who seeks to avail himself of the defense. For if the defense is raised,
the courts permit the introduction of rebuttal evidence to prove the defendant's
prior criminal history in order to negate a claim of "unwary innocence." Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 441, 451-52 (1932).
The prejudice inherent in such a
situation is obvious.
61 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1978) (Frankfurter, J.,concurring) (characterizing entrapment decisions as "gropingly . . . express[ing] the
feeling of outrage at conduct of law enforcers . . .but without the formulated basis
in reason that . . . is the first duty of courts to construct"); Mikell, supra note 54,
at 263 ("there seems to be no rational basis for the doctrine"); Note, The Serpent
Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense,
74 YALE: L.J. 942, 943 (1965) (characterizing the entrapment defense as "a

failure").
The law of entrapment has inspired an immense body of scholarly literature.
See Park, supra note 58, at 167 n.13, in which the author catalogues the numerous
commentaries on the topic.
62The subjective-objective dichotomy is used to refer to the two formulations
of the entrapment defense. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496-97
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440-41
(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Various other labels have been used to characterize the two formulations. The subjective test has been called the "federal
defense," the "genesis of the criminal design" formula and the "origin of the
criminal intent" formula; the objective test has been referred to as the "hypotheticalperson" defense and the "police conduct" test. See Donnelly, Judicial Control of
Informants, Spies, Stool Pidgeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YAIE L.J. 1091,
1102 (1951); Park, supra note 58, at 165-66.
63 United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Jannotti, No. 80-166 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1980);
People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978);
People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1980).
See generally Note,
Viability of the Entrapment Defense in the Constitutional Context, 59 IowA L.
REv. 655 (1974); Note, Defense of Entrapment: Next Move-Due Process?, 1971
UTAH L. Rzv. 266.
64 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
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ment is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials." 65 Applying this
test in Sorrells v. United States 61 and Sherman v. United States,67
the Supreme Court held that the entrapment defense should have
been available. The cases are factually indistinguishable. Fedeal undercover agents gained the confidence of the defendants and
repeatedly importuned them to provide the agents with illegal substances. In Sorrells, the agent posed as a tourist sharing war experiences with the defendant. In Sherman, the agent posed as a
narcotics addict in desperate need of drugs. Despite initial refusals, the defendants finally capitulated and were prosecuted and
convicted. In both cases, a majority of the Court adopted the
subjective test: "[W]hen the criminal design originates with the
officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an
innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense
and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute," the
entrapment defense may be raised.68
In two later decisions, again applying the subjective test, the
Supreme Court ruled that the entrapment defense could not be
raised. In United States v. Russell,69 a government agent supplied
the defendant with "an essential ingredient" in the manufacture of
narcotics.

70

In Hampton v. United States,71 an undercover agent

65 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) (emphasis added).
See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372
(1958).
66287 U.S. 435 (1932).
67356 U.S. 369 (1958).
68
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added) (quoting
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 442). In Sorrells and Sherman, the majority
predicated the entrapment defense upon the theory that in enacting the criminal
statutes in question, Congress could not have intended "that [the] processes of
detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government
officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them
to [commit the crimes] and to punish them." Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
at 448; accord, Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 372.
The majority's use of statutory construction to justify the defense of entrapment
has been criticized by other members of the Court as "strained and unwarranted
rationalizing," Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 455-56 (Roberts, J., concurring) and "sheer fiction," Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 379 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The critics argue that the only legislative intent disclosed
by the statute is in the several elements necessary for conviction; that if the defendant's conduct includes all of those elements-as it did in Sorrells and Shermanhe should be relieved from punitive consequences not because he is innocent of the
offense, but, rather, because of the public policy "against enforcement of the law
by lawless means." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
09411 U.S. 423 (1973).
70 d. 447 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
71425 U.S. 484 (1976).
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supplied the defendant with illegal narcotics-the "corpus delicti" 72
--which the defendant then sold to another government agent. In
both cases, however, the defendants' conceded predisposition to
commit narcotics crimes 73 rendered unavailable the defense of entrapment.
Under the subjective formulation, therefore, the Court often
confines its inquiry to the defendant's character and excludes from
consideration the government's overt behavior. By contrast, the
objective test focuses not on the defendant's innocence, predisposition, or criminal propensity, but rather on the acts of law enforcement officials that "create a crime and then punish the criminal,
its creature." 74 In the words of Justice Frankfurter, "The crucial
question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct itself
is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls
below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper
use of government power." 75
In addition to the majority's subjective and Frankfurter's objective entrapment formulations, due process doctrines have sometimes been invoked as a basis for entrapment. Although entrap2

Id. 489.
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. at 433.
74 Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
quoted in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 437 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The objective test has been adopted by the Model Penal Code and the proposed new federal criminal code. See MoDEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Prop. Off.
Draft, 1962); U.S. NATIONAL ComnmnssioN ON REFOnmO r FEDERAL LAws, A
POPOSED NEvw FEDERAL CRu-MINAL CODE § 702(2) (1971).
Commentators on the
subject have overwhelmingly favored the objective test. See W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTT, supra note 58, at 371-73; authorities cited in Park, supra note 58, at 167
n.13.
75
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Concurring in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 430, 459 (1932),
Justice Roberts stated:
The applicable principle is that the courts must be closed to the trial
of a crime instigated by the government's own agents. No other issue, no
comparison of equities as between the guilty official and the guilty defendant, has any place in the enforcement of this overruling principle of
public policy.
Directly related to the substantive issue whether entrapment should be subjectively or objectively based is the procedural issue whether the defense is one
of fact for the jury or law for the court. The rule, generally, is that a subjective
test focusing on the defendant's predisposition raises a question of fact for the jury,
whereby the defendant must affirmatively prove that he was not predisposed. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 377; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 452.
See also N.Y. PENAL LAw § 40.05 (McKinney 1975). However, if entrapment is
aimed at deterring impermissible government actions-an objective approach-then
it is viewed as a bar to prosecution and appropriate for the court's determination.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
73
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ment is not a defense of constitutional magnitude, 76 the Supreme
Court has suggested that when undercover methods are sufficiently
outrageous, principles of due process could be invoked to bar
prosecution regardless of the defendant's predisposition. 77 Thus,
even in jurisdictions that apply the subjective test for entrapment,
due process is nevertheless available as a defense to sufficiently out78
rageous governmental conduct.
76
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973). The Supreme Court
noted in Russell that because the defense was "not of a constitutional dimension,"
Congress could broaden the substantive definition if it chose to. Id. The proposed new federal criminal code would do just that. See note 74 supra.
77
Citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the well-known stomach
pumping case, the Court in Russell stated: "[W]e may some day be presented
with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous
that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking
judicial processes to obtain a conviction . . ...
411 U.S. at 431-32. In light of
this statement, it is surprising that three years later, three justices would write:
"[in Russell] [M]e ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrapment could
ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as this one, where
the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime was established." Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976) (opinion of Rehnquist, J., joined
by Burger, C.J., and White, J.) (emphasis added). However, the concurring
(Powell, J. and Blacknun, J.) and dissenting (Brennan, J.,Stewart, J.,and
Marshall, J.) opinions in Hampton (Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of the case) suggest that a due process defense is available
to a predisposed defendant who has been entrapped by flagrant governmental conduct. Id. 495, 497. For cases involving an application of a due process defense,
see note 63 supra.
In two cases, the Supreme Court invoked the due process variation of entrapment to reverse convictions. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Raley v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959). In Cox, the defendants were convicted of unlawfully
picketing near a courthouse in violation of a Louisiana statute. Uncontradicted
testimony showed that the local chief of police gave the demonstrators permission
to march where they did and assured them that such a demonstration would not
be one "near" the courthouse within the terms of the statute.
In Raley, the defendants were convicted of contempt following their refusal
to answer questions before the Ohio "Un-American Activities Commission" investigating alleged subversive activities. The defendants were informed by the Commission that they had the right to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination.
Despite such assurances, the defendant's contempt convictions were affirmed by the
Ohio Supreme Court on the ground that a state immunity statute deprived them
of the privilege.
The Supreme Court found in both cases that to sustain the convictions "would
be to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State-convicting a citizen
for exercising a privilege which the State had told him was available to him." Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 570; Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. at 438.
Although Sorrellk was cited in Raley as indirect doctrinal authority, Raley v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. at 438, quaere whether the Supreme Court is correctly invoking
entrapment doctrine as distinguished from principles of estoppel. See Note, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal Cases, 78 YAI.E L.J. 1046 (1969).
78
See People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714
(1978), in which the New York Court of Appeals invoked due process standards to
reverse a narcotics conviction of a defendant predisposed to commit the crime. The
court found that the government's brutalization and deception of an informant in
order to have him lure the defendant into New York to sell him drugs was "repugnant," "lawless," and "ugly" and "revealed a brazen and continuing pattern in dis-
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When applied to perjury, the entrapment defense encounters
difficulty. Conceptually, there are obvious problems in applying
the majority's subjective test for entrapment to the perjury offense.
First, it is highly unrealistic to view perjury as the kind of crime
to which undercover techniques of law enforcement are directed.
It is difficult to imagine law enforcement officials baiting witnesses
into the commission of perjury by repeated entreaties or temptations. To be sure, it is the prosecutor's questions that elicit the
false responses, but it is a giant leap from that premise to a conclusion that the prosecutor "implanted in the mind of an [honest
witness] the disposition to [lie]."
Second, it is incongruous, except in the most hypothetical
cases, to speak of a predisposition to commit perjury. In inferring
a predisposition to commit a substantive crime-for example, racketeering or extortion-judicial inquiry may focus upon the defendant's resistance to undercover agents' entreaties or pressures, his
criminal record, or his reputation. In contrast, determining whether
a defendant was predisposed to commit perjury raises what is probably an unanswerable question: Is the defendant a truth-teller or a
lie-teller? Indeed, the notion of a predisposition to commit perjury
has little meaning except in the sense that a person is an habitual
liar. In sum, perjury is not the type of crime to which the subjective test for entrapment can meaningfully be applied.
Although it makes no sense to inquire into a defendant's predisposition to perjure himself, it does not follow that the entrapment defense has no bearing upon a perjury charge. An approach
to entrapment focusing on the unfairness of the government's conduct-either the objective test or the due process test-clearly would
be relevant in the context of perjury. Instead of looking at the
witness's predisposition to lie, the inquiry would center on the
prosecutor's premeditated design to trap the witness into perjury.
The task of proving deliberate prosecutorial conduct of this kind
is extremely difficult.1 9 But if such law enforcement conduct is
unfair, an objective or due process test for entrapment may provide
the basis for a meaningful and viable defense to perjury.
regard of fundamental rights."
N.Y.S.2d at 720.

44 N.Y.2d at 522-23, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406

One frequently cited article on the subject recommends that to abate the prac-

tice of entrapment, the state-without excusing the defendant--should prosecute
the offending official either for criminal solicitation or as an accomplice. See
Mikel, supra note 54, at 264. In this connection, see N.Y. PENAL LA%w § 35.05(1)
(McKinney 1975) ("conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justi-

fiable and not criminal when .. .performed by a public servant in the reasonable
exercise of his official powers, duties or functions").
79 See text accompanying notes 140-87 infra.
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The courts have already implicitly acknowledged that it is unfair, and hence impermissible, for a prosecutor to summon and
question a witness before a grand jury solely for the purpose of
procuring perjured testimony.8 0 It is difficult to take issue with
this proposition. The purpose of a grand jury investigation is to
ferret out crime. In the words of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor's questions are "for the purpose of bringing out the truth of
the matter under inquiry." 81 As noted earlier, the perjury offense
is designed to safeguard the integrity of this truth-seeking process.
If, under the guise of an otherwise legitimate investigation, a prosecutor solicits testimony with the premeditated design of indicting
the witness for perjury, the grand jury is put to an unintended and
inappropriate use. The extraordinary powers of the grand jury 32
are focused on a single witness in an effort to draw perjurious testimony from him. The narrowly circumscribed rights of witnesses
before a grand jury and the secrecy of the ex parte proceedings
contribute to the unfairness of the situation. The relative helplessness of the witness caught in a perjury trap aside, there appears
to be no legitimate governmental interest in such harsh treatmentsS
80

See cases cited in note 15 supra.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
See also United States v. Lardieri, 497 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1974), in which the
defendant, convicted of perjury pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), advanced several claims
of error. The Third Circuit disposed of these issues rather quickly, and then addressed an issue that had not been briefed or raised below. The court observed
that "the reason for having a witness testify before a grand jury is to discover the
truth, not to lay the groundwork for a perjury conviction." 497 F.2d at 320. It
then remanded the case for a hearing on the propriety of the prosecutor's actions
before the grand jury. The court was particularly troubled by the possibility that
the prosecutor had misled the defendant on the subject of his right to recant under
§ 1623(d). Id. 321. Although the defendant's conviction was ultimately sustained, United States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1974), the case illustrates
the uneasiness that deliberate attempts to procure perjury have generated in the
courts. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
82 See notes 16-38 supra & accompanying text.
83 Courts have frequently looked to the societal or governmental need for particular types of police trickery or deceit in judging the fairness of law enforcement
techniques. Thus, Justice Powell, concurring in Hampton, reasoned that the finding of a due process violation because of police over-involvement in a crime
"would be especially difcult to show with respect to contraband offenses, which
are so difficult to detect in the absence of undercover Government involvement.'
425 U.S. at 431-32 (emphasis added). See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d
373, 377 n.6 (3d Cir. 1978) (in evaluating fairness "the court must consider the
nature of the crime and the tools available to law enforcement agencies to combat
it"); United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1975) (condemning
police activity lacking "no justifying social objective").
The prevention of perjury does not require the use of law enforcement trickery
and deceit. Such tactics are most necessary in preventing covert, consensual crimes,
such as organized crime or loansharking, which often involve a fairly complex underground organization. Plainly, perjury is not this type of crime. Perjury of81
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As noted above, the grand jury investigation has the purpose of
"bringing out the truth of the matter under inquiry." Plainly, if a
prosecutor knows the truth and questions a witness solely in order
to elicit and preserve falsehoods, the truth-seeking process is not
furthered. Indeed, by refusing, for example, to probe the witness's
responses, the prosecutor may actually frustrate the search for
truth. s4 In short, the perjury trap is both unfair to its victims and
contrary to the purposes of grand jury investigation.
II.

AN EXAMPLE: TRAP-SETTING OR HONEST INVESTIGATION?

At this point, an example might be helpful.8 5 Assume that
during an investigation into political corruption, government in-

vestigators using a court-ordered wiretap s1 secretly overhear a telefenses can be adequately dealt with by orthodox law enforcement techniques: if

a prosecutor suspects that testimony may have been perjurious, he may seek evidence to support his suspicion. In short, the justifications for law enforcement
trickery in other contexts are inapplicable to perjury. This conclusion, as the cases
noted above suggest, weighs heavily against claims that the perjury trap is fair.
84 See notes 228-29 infra & accompanying text.
85 The example, although fictitious, is improvised from actual cases with which
the author has had some contact.
86
Electronic surveillance techniques such as wiretapping and bugging, which
are conducted without the consent of the parties and which involve the secret
installation of mechanical devices at specific locations to receive and transmit conversation, are generally felt by law enforcement officials to be indispensable to
effective investigation and prosecution of white collar and organized crime. See
C. FIsmmAN, WIRETAIPP -NG AND EAVESDROPPING 3 (1978); PRESiDENT'S REPoRT,
supra note 4, at 201-03. Federal law and the laws of 25 states permit courtordered electronic surveillance in varying circumstances when the parties to the
conversation have not consented to it. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1976); N.J.
STAT. AiNN. § 2A: 156A-8 (West 1971); N.Y. CmM. PRoc. LAw § 700.10 (McKinney 1971).

Equally indispensable to law enforcement is electronic surveillance techniques
in which one of the parties to the conversation consents to have the conversation
recorded. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion);
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); United States v. Haldeman, 559
F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); United States v.
Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973).
Most pertinent to this Article, however, is the utility of the recorded conversations to a prosecutor in his examination of the witness in the grand jury, particularly when a perjury charge is contemplated. Assuming a prosecutor possesses an
electronic recording of what the witness has said on a previous occasion-inherently
"accurate and reliable," United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971) (plurality
opinion)-the prosecutor has the evidentiary basis upon which to prepare a perjury charge should the witness testify inconsistently with his recorded statements.
See United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 2922 (1980); United States v. Beitling, 545 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 918 (1977); United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178 (1st
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976); People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d
240, 385 N.E.2d 1218, 413 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1978); People v. Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d
232, 385 N.E.2d 1214, 413 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1978); People v. Lee, 34 N.Y.2d
884, 316 N.E.2d 715, 359 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1974).
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phone conversation between a person named White, leader of a
local political party, and an acquaintance of his named Singer, a
real estate developer under scrutiny by the district attorney's office
in connection with alleged pay-offs to housing inspectors. A transcript of a portion of the ten-minute telephone conversation follows:
WhrnE: Get to the point.
SINGER: Let me ask you this. The D.A. says I gave money
to building people. I'm being looked at very
closely.
WHrE: Who's talking?
SINGER: I don't know. That's one of the things I wanted
to ask you. Who it is and whether this thing can
be worked out. You don't know what it's doing
to me.
WHITE: Do you have a lawyer?
SINGER: I haven't talked to one yet.
WHITE: Well, you should get a lawyer who knows his way
around, I mean a lawyer who can talk to these
people.
Knows which people?
WHrE: A lawyer who can straighten things out, who
knows the D.A. Why don't you talk to my
brother Al. He's been there before. He knows
how to handle these things. Talk to him. He
may be able to help you. If anybody can quash
it with the D.A., he can.
SINGER:

Four months later, White was subpoenaed to appear before a
grand jury. Prior to his appearance, and represented by counsel,
White was informally advised by the prosecutor that the grand jury
was conducting an investigation into official corruption, including
the crimes of bribery, conspiracy, and official misconduct, and that
it desired to question White in that regard.87 White was advised
87It is not uncommon for an attorney representing a witness who has been
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury to arrange a conference with the prosecu-

tor in charge of the investigation. The attorney will seek information as to the
general subject matter of the grand jury's inquiry, whether his client is a "target"

of the investigation, and whether the grand jury will confer immunity upon his
client. See ABA ANTrrUST SECTnON, HANDBOOK ON ANITRUST GRAND JURy INREPRESENTAtiON oF WrrVESTiGATIONS 61 (1978); NATIONAL LAwYERS GUMr.,
NESSES BEFOnE FE.mDaL GRAND JunuEs 17, 28 (2d rev. ed. 1979); Smaltz, Tactical
Considerationsfor Effective Representation During A Government Investigation, 16
AL. C a. L. REv. 383, 388-403 (1979).
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by the prosecutor 88 that he was not a target of the investigation, 9
that he could refuse to answer any questions by invoking his fifth
amendment privilege, 90 and that in the event he chose to invoke
the privilege, the grand jury would compel his testimony by conferring transactional immunity upon him. 91 White's attorney stated
88 Although the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor need not advise a
grand jury witness of his status, or of the availability of constitutional protection,
many prosecutors' offices routinely advise witnesses of the subject matter of the
investigation, that they are targets of the investigation, that they have a privilege
against self-incrimination, that their testimony may be used against them, and that
they may have a reasonable opportunity to step outside the grand jury room to
consult with counsel. United States v. Jacobs, 531 F.2d 87, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1976);
M. FRAExEL & G. NA"rAis, supra note 18, at 62; UNrrEn STATES ATTonszys'
M UA--Cnmsnw. DnsoN § 9-11.250 (1978).
89 A "target" of a grand jury investigation is a person linked by substantial

evidence to the commission of a crime who, in the judgment of the prosecutor,
is a putative defendant. A "subject" of an investigation is a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investigation. UNTED STATES ATrORNEys" MAsN-uA,
supra note 88. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
there is no constitutional impropriety in summoning prospective defendantstargets-to testify before a grand jury. United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 179
n.8 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 584 n.9 (1976); United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1973). See note 9 supra. For "the very
purpose of the inquiry is to ferret out criminal conduct, and sometimes potentially
guilty persons are prime sources of information." United States v. Wong, 431
U.S. at 179-80 n.8.
Although White may have been a subject of the investigation, it does not
appear from the information in the possession of the prosecutors that White was a
potential defendant, however sinister his suggestions may have sounded. The
prosecutor was not being deceptive in representing that White was not considered
a target of the investigation.
90 The most important exemption from the duty to testify is the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972). For the history and role of the fifth amendment
privilege, see L. LEvY, OlnuINs OF TiE FiFTH AMENDMENT (1968); 8 J. WiGmonE,
EVIDENCE §§ 2250-51 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Morgan, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949).
See also DeLuna v. United
States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J.).
91 Immunity statutes represent an accommodation between the government's
power to compel testimony and the witness's privilege against compulsory selfincrimination. Wigmore referred to such statutes as "expedients resorted to for
the investigation of many offenses, chiefly those whose proof and punishment were
otherwise impracticable because of the implication in the offense itself of all who
could bear useful testimony." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2281 at 492 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See generally Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 92-93 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
Immunity statutes "have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence"
and are presently in effect in every jurisdiction in America. Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 445-47 (1972). See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976) (general
federal immunity statute); N.Y. CRIM. PNoc. LA-w § 50.20 (McKinney 1971). They
have been characterized by the Supreme Court as essential to effective law enforcement and, indeed, a "part of our constitutional fabric." Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. at 447; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J.).
A grant of immunity is the quid pro quo to compel the witness to answer,
even though the answers would implicate the witness in criminal activity. United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 575 (1976). "Immunity displaces the danger." Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. at 439. See SENATE REPORT, supra note
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that White would cooperate fully with the grand jury but would
request immunity. The prosecutor agreed.
After taking the oath, White was questioned by the prosecutor.
Following preliminary background questions, White was asked
whether he had ever intervened on anyone's behalf to influence
official actions in a legal proceeding. 92 White stoutly denied that
10, at 55, which recommended the passage of a general federal immunity statute
more restrictive than its predecessors.
One of the major constitutional issues in this area has been the scope of the
immunity conferred, and whether it effectively "displaces the danger" of selfincrimination. There are three options open to a prosecutor with respect to a
witness's testimony: first, use of the testimony against the witness in a later proceeding; second, use of information derived from that testimony against the witness
in a later proceeding; third, prosecution of the witness based on the transaction
about which he gave evidence. The question whether an immunity statute must
protect against the use, the derivative use, or prosecution for the transaction itself
has caused difficulty. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422
(1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892). Suffice that to pass constitutional muster, an immunity statute
only need confer immunity from use of the testimony or the evidence derived from
it, and need not extend so as to immunize against prosecution for the transaction
itself. Kastigar v. United States, 408 U.S. 441 (1972). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 6002
(1976) (providing use and derivative-use immunity) with N.Y. Camn.
toc. LAw
§ 50.10 (McKinney 1971) (providing transactional immunity). If a defendant who
testifies under a grant of use and derivative-use immunity is subsequently prosecuted, the government has the burden of showing that the evidence it seeks to use
is derived from a source totally independent of the compelled testimony. Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. at 460; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at
79 n.18. Placing such an affirmative duty on the government offers the defendant
"very substantial protection." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 461.
It is also settled that immunity statutes are a quid pro quo for truthful testimony. False testimony given under a grant of immunity is explicitly excepted
from the grant and is subject to prosecution for perjury. See United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980); Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911);
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976); N.Y. Crn. Pnoc. LAw § 50.10(1) (McKinney 1971).
Finally, it should be noted that a prosecutor's ability to set a perjury trap
often may be dependent upon his ability to immunize his target. Some jurisdictions, however, place significant restrictions upon a prosecutor's ability to obtain a
grant of immunity for a witness. Frequently, the prosecutor is required to appear
before a judicial officer and make a showing of materiality, e.g., NEv.

§ 178.572 (1973)

REv. STAT.

(court may grant immunity to "any material witness"), or pro-

priety, e.g., MIcH. Coma,. LAws ANN. § 767.19a (1980 Supp.) (judge may grant
prosecuting attorney's application for immunity for a witness if "in the interest of
justice"), before a witness will be immunized. In some jurisdictions, the procedures are rather onerous, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 20E (Law. Co-op.
1974), while in others, grants are automatic, e.g., K.. STAT. ANNw. § 22-3102
(1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3436 (1974).
In some instances, prosecutors
face administrative obstacles, such as requirements that a prosecutor notify or
obtain the approval of a superior before seeking a grant of immunity, e.g., MAss.
AN. LAws ch. 233, § 20E (Law. Co-op. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1053
(Michie 1978). These judicial and administrative restrictions on a prosecutor's
ability to immunize witnesses may provide an indirect safeguard against the use
of the perjury trap. It is unlikely, however, that these restrictions will be applied
with either sufficient scrutiny or consistency to provide adequate safeguards against
the use of perjury traps.
92
Inherent in this type of question are highly ambiguous terms such as "intervened" and "influence," which raise issues pertinent to the perjury trap. See
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he had ever done so. White then was asked whether he knew a
person named Singer, and whether he had talked to him recently.
White said he had. The prosecutor then engaged White in the
following interrogation:
Q. You say that Singer asked you for advice?
A. Yes, he asked me for advice on a legal matter and I told
him I couldn't give him any advice.
Q. Did he tell you what kind of legal matter it was?
A. No.
Q. Did he ask you anything else?
A. He asked me if there was anything I could do for him.
Q. What did you tell him?
A. I told him that I could not give him legal advice; that
if he wanted legal advice he should go to see a lawyer.
Q. Did he say anything else?
A. He asked me if I knew any lawyers. I told him my
brother was a lawyer and that if he needed legal advice
he could speak to my brother. That's as far as I can
recall the conversation. It lasted only a few minutes.
Q. Did you tell Singer that he should get a lawyer who
could influence the D.A.?
A. I did not.
Q. Did you tell Singer that he should get a lawyer who
could fix things with the D.A.?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Did you tell Singer that your brother could quash
things with the D.A.?
A. No.
On the basis of this testimony, the grand jury indicted White
on three counts of perjury for his denials in response to the last
three questions. The evidence against White was the authenticated
tape recording of his telephone conversation with Singer previously
93
introduced in evidence before the grand jury.
note 257 infra & accompanying text. Thus, a prosecutor bent on trapping a witness into giving answers subject to contradiction might employ vague, ambiguous,

or uncertain terms that the witness might truthfully understand to have one meaning but that others could understand differently. See United States v. Wall, 371
F.2d 398, 400 (6th Cir. 1967)

(question upon which perjury charge was based

was susceptible of two different interpretations); O'Connor v. United States, 240
F.2d 404, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1956)

(use of phrase "the Communist conspiracy" is "so

vague that the witness is unable to answer with knowledge of its meaning");
United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ("[the word
'sympathizer' is not of sufficiently certain meaning to sustain a charge of perjury").

See also Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358, 360 (1973).
93
Assuming a proper foundation is laid by government witnesses to establish
that the tape recording is the actual and true recording of the White-Singer con-

versation, and that the voices are those of White and Singer, the tape would con-
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For purposes of this discussion, several points should be noted.
For one thing, a perjury indictment sounding in corruption against
a major political figure would be a newsworthy event, one particularly tantalizing to an ambitious prosecutor who covets a public
image as an aggressive crime fighter.9 4 There was, after all, insufficient evidence to charge White with any substantive offense and,
from the prosecutor's perspective, little chance of connecting him
with crimes of bribery or official corruption. 95 This is implicit in
the prosecutor's decision to immunize White, thereby forfeiting
any chance of prosecuting him for a substantive crime relating to
the subject matter of his testimony.90
By immunizing White, the prosecutor in effect represented
that he sought the witness's truthful testimony primarily to further the investigation. The prosecutor's questions, however, were
not directed to the witness's knowledge of antecedent crime or misconduct. Rather, his questions-largely tracking a transcript of the
recording-related to whether the witness had said something that
stitute sufficient evidence to prove false White's testimony. See, e.g., People v.
Lee, 34 N.Y.2d 884, 316 N.E.2d 715, 359 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1974). See also C.
FrsH.AN, supra note 86, at 324 n.12, 470-71.
94 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (massive publicity of murder
trial held two weeks before general election at which chief prosecutor a candidate
for a judgeship). The American Bar Association has implicitly recognized that
some prosecutors use the media to exploit their office and gain favor with the
public. See ABA, STANDAnDS RELA.TIG TO TE ADmINISTRATION OF CRImINAL
JusmTcE, THE PRosEcuTnoN FUNcToN § 1.3(a) (1974) ("The prosecutor should

not exploit his office by means of personal publicity connected with a case before
trial, during trial and thereafter.").
Interestingly, the New York perjury cases against several prominent individuals,
see notes 12-14 supra & accompanying text, later dismissed as traps, received considerable "front-page" acclaim by the media when the indictments were first announced. For newspaper reports on People v. Tyler, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 5,
1976, at Al, col. 2 ("Two Juries Indict a New York Judge"); N.Y.L.J., Nov. 5,
1976, at 1, col. 3 ("2 Indictments Accuse Judge of Perjury, Official Misconduct").
For reports on People v. Brust, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1976, § 1, at 1, Col. 3
("Ex-State Justice Charged with Lying to Grand Jury"); N.Y.L.J., Feb. 25, 1976,
at 1, col. 2 ("Perjury Counts Filed Against Former Judge"). For reports on
People v. Monaghan, see N.Y. Times, March 21, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 6 ('Ex-City
Police Head is Facing Indictment"); N.Y. Times, March 22, 1974, § 2, at 43, col. 5
("Monaghan, Ex-Police Commissioner, is Cited for Perjury in Loan-Sharking").
For reports on People v. Rao, see N.Y. Times, May 15, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 8 ("A
Customs Judge and Son Accused of Lying to Jury-Nadjari Cites Paul Rao, Sr.
and Jr. in Connection with Inquiry on Bribery Plan-Law Partner Is Named");
N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1974, at 1, col. 4 ("Judge Rao and Son Indicted for Perjury
by Nadjari Jury"). For report on People v. Blumenthal, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 6,
1975, § 1, at 1, col. 6 ("Blumenthal Calls Charge 'Outrageous, Unfounded').
95 1 assume that the tape recording is the only evidence remotely suggesting
arguably corrupt conduct by White, and that further investigation revealed no
additional information linking White to misconduct. Needless to say, the recording alone, even if it could be construed as some sort of criminal solicitation, fails
to sufficiently demonstrate a mens rea usually necessary to charge a crime. See
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
9
6 See note 91 supra.
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the prosecutor and the grand jury already secretly knew the witness had said. There is no indication that truthful answers to
these questions would materially have advanced the grand jury's
inquiry. 97 Moreover, even assuming that the questions were put
to White in good faith, it is strange that no effort was made to
stimulate White's recollection.98 The whole tenor of the question97

jury.

"Materiality" is one of the most troublesome elements in the law of perPsajury REPORT, supra note 3, at 238.

At common law and under nearly

all current statutes, materiality is a required element of perjury.
sToNE,

CoanmmrENAs

0

4 W. BrLcK-

137 (false statement "must be in some point material

to the question in dispute" and not "be in some trifling circumstance to which
no regard is paid"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.20 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
See note 3 & statutes cited therein. See also Annot., 22 A.L.R. FED. 379 (1975).
The theory is that false testimony to unimportant or irrelevant questions will not
usually impede government, nor does such testimony indicate antisocial propensities
of the declarant. See United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 867-68 (D.C.
Cir. 1954) (Edgerton, J., concurring); MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.20 (Tent Draft
No. 6, 1957). The test of materiality has been variously described as any false
testimony that would have a "natural effect or tendency to impede, influence or
dissuade the grand jury from pursuing its investigation," United States v. Stone,
429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970), or is "capable of influencing the tribunal on
the issue before it," Blackmon v. United States, 108 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir.
1940). Some courts, however, do not require that the false testimony be pertinent
to the investigation but only "important in some substantial degree." United
States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 866-67 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Edgerton, J., concurring). It is not necessary to establish that the false testimony actually impeded
the grand jury investigation. United States v. Percell, 526 F.2d 189, 190 (9th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Tyrone, 451 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1971) ("The
only requirement is that the question be material to the subject of the grand jury
inquiry."). Whatever the test employed, deciding whether false testimony is
material has proved difficult. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.20 (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1957); PERjuRy REPORT, supra note 3, at 269-84.
The federal courts and most state courts view materiality as a question of law.
See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298 (1929); Annot., 62 A.L.R. 2d
1027 (1958). But see People v. Ianniello, 36 N.Y.2d 137, 144, 325 N.E.2d 146,
149, 365 N.Y.S.2d 821, 826 (1975) (materiality is a question of fact). In jurisdictions construing materiality as a question of fact, the courts permit the introduction of collateral evidence of the crimes under investigation by the grand
jury-evidence that may seriously prejudice the defendant-in order to demonstrate
that the questions were pertinent. See, e.g., People v. Stanard, 32 N.Y.2d 143,
297 N.E.2d 77, 344 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1973).
98
One of the major issues in connection with the perjury trap is whether
and to what extent a prosecutor must seek to refresh the recollection of the witness
who gives testimony that the prosecutor knows can be contradicted. Of course,
at trial, the cross-examiner must lay a foundation-ask the witness whether he
made the supposed contradictory statement-before impeaching a witness by a
prior inconsistent statement. 3A J. WiGMoBE, EVmENcE § 1025 (Chadbourn rev.
1970); FED. R. Evm. 613(b).
The Supreme Court has stated:
It is the responsibility of the lawyer to probe; testimonial interrogation,
and cross-examination in particular, is a probing, prying, pressing form of
inquiry. If a witness evades, it is the lawyer's responsibility to recognize
the evasion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the
whole truth with the tools of adversary examination.
Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1973).
The courts seem to be in agreement that there is no requirement that the
prosecutor in the grand jury stimulate the recollection of the witness or inform
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ing could be viewed as playing upon the ambiguity of language
and the hazy memory of the witness as against the clarity of the
prosecutor's meaning to the grand jurors and their immediate recall of the recorded conversation.
From the prosecutor's perspective, however, White had the
broadest immunity and was under no compulsion to speak anything
but the truth. He was represented by an attorney who, at the
very least, was readily accessible for legal advice. It could be
argued that White's memory was not stale and required no stimulation.99 Nor is it unreasonable for the prosecutor to have expected
that forthright and honest testimony might have yielded information material to the grand jury's inquiry.10 0 Finally, White's answers could be found by a jury to have been wilfully false, that is,
uttered with knowledge of their falsity.101
This example is intended to crystallize the complexity of the
perjury trap. The interrogation of White illustrates how factors
such as materiality, memory, and mistake might be exploited by a
prosecutor to elicit a technical perjury. In terms of entrapment
doctrine, it is meaningless to talk about White's predisposition to
lie in the sense that the government implanted the idea of lying
the witness of contradictory statements either by the witness or other witnesses.
See United States v. Jacobs, 531 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
429 U.S. 909 (1976); United States v. DelToro, 513 F.2d 656, 664-65 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975); People v. Breindel, 73 Misc. 2d 734,
739, 342 N.Y.S.2d 428, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 45 A.D. 2d 691, 356 N.Y.S.2d
626, aff'd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 928, 324 N.E.2d 545, 365 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1974). But
see People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 261, 385 N.E.2d 1224, 1230, 413 N.Y.S.2d

295, 300 (1978).

99
Investigations may involve a witness's recollection many years after the
event in question. See, e.g., United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951); People v. Rinaldi, 44 A.D.2d 745, 354 N.Y.S.2d
482, aff'd mem., 34 N.Y.2d 843, 316 N.E.2d 346, 359 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1974). The
event recounted in this hypothetical happened only four months ago. Further,
White demonstrated some recollection by volunteering part of the subject matter
of the conversation-Singer's request for advice and need for a lawyer. Issues as
to the memorability of an event usually involve questions of fact for jury determination. See People v. Dunleavy, 41 A.D.2d 717, 341 N.Y.S.2d 500, aff'd mem.,
33 N.Y.2d 573, 301 N.E.2d 432, 347 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1973). But see People v.
Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 258, 385 N.E.2d 1224, 1228, 413 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299
(1978).
'o

See note 97 supra.

101 Assuming false testimony material to the investigation given during a valid

grand jury proceeding, it must also be demonstrated that the testimony was wilfully false, that is, that the witness did not believe his testimony to be true. See
United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823
(1973); United States v. Bronston, 453 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1971), re'd on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 352 (1973); United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971). "Wilfalness" is a question of fact for the
jury, United States v. Letchos, 316 F.2d 481 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
824 (1963), and may be inferred from proof of falsity itself. United States v.
Devitt, 499 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975).
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into an otherwise truthful person. However, if White could show
that the government deliberately contrived a procedure to ambush
him into perjury, he might properly invoke an entrapment defense
under the objective formula, as well as under principles of
due process.
Having seen the perjury trap at work, it is necessary to explore
the case law on the subject. The judicial doctrines are various,
inconsistent, and generally unsatisfactory from an analytical standpoint. After discussing the law, I will return to White's case, and
propose a test to be applied and factors to be considered in analyzing the perjury trap.
III.

PERJURY AND ENTRAPMENT: VARIETIES OF JUDICIAL

DOCTRINE

A. Use of Oppressive Tactics to ProcurePerjury
One of the first reported cases to consider an entrapment attack upon a perjury indictment was United States v. Remington,0 2
a "red menace" case that reveals some of the opportunities for
prosecutorial abuse of the perjury offense. Apart from its historical
significance, 0 3 Remington would not be notable except for a powerful dissent by Learned Hand articulating the principle that oppressive government tactics may excuse perjury.'0
William Remington was indicted for perjury by a federal grand
jury in New York for denying prior membership in the Communist
F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954).
10 3 Remington is one of several perjury cases stemming from grand jury or
other official investigations concerning internal security and communism. See, e.g.,
United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297 (3d
Cir. 1954); United States v. Per, 210 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1954); Vetterli v. United
States, 198 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 344 U.S. 872 (1952);
United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948
(1951); United States v. Laut, 17 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Much has been written about official and unofficial "witch-hunts" during this
102 208

period. See, e.g., A. BAumj-, GovERNmm Tr By INvEsiGAT N (1955); M. BErxNAP, CoLD WAR PorbcAL JusTiacE: Tim SmrrH AcT, THE CoMMUNIST PARTY, AND

AzmmucAN Cvw LmERTs (1977); R. CARR, Tim HouSE Comnrrmx oN UNAsmncAN Acnvns, 1945-1950 (1952); N. WEYL, THE BAxr. AcAmsT DisLoYALrY (1951). Little has been written, however, about the aggressive use of
the grand jury to indict for perjury individuals who presumably could not otherwise be charged with criminal offenses. It may be no coincidence that in a climate
of political crisis, when the public craves victims, zealous and ambitious prosecutors frequently seek to satisfy that appetite by resorting to perjury charges against
persons vulnerable because of associations held or utterances made many years ago.
It may well be that every one of these cases, in reality, is a perjury trap.
104 208 F.2d at 571-75.
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Party.0 5 He was convicted after a jury trial, but the judgment
was reversed because of error in the jury charge. 10 6 Rather than
retrying Remington on the original indictment, the government
secured a second indictment against him. This indictment charged
Remington with giving false testimony at his trial in defense to
the first indictment; this testimony also related to his affiliation
with the Communist Party. 0 7 Remington was convicted and, on
appeal, asserted two interrelated grounds for reversal. He claimed,
first, that the first grand jury proceeding involved government misconduct of such flagrance that any fruits stemming from it should
be suppressed. Second, he alleged that the government impermis0 5
'
The defendant had been summoned in May, 1950, before a grand jury for
the Southern District of New York investigating "possible violations of the espionage
laws." He'was questioned about his alleged membership in the Communist Party
from 1934 to 1944. The charge of perjury was predicated on the question: "At
any time have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?" to which Remington responded under oath, "I have never been." See 191 F.2d 246, 248 (2d
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 907 (1952).
The validity of the indictment was sustained over a claim that the question
put to Remington was ambiguous. The Second Circuit held that the indictment
validly charged Remington with perjury because it accused him of not believing
his statement denying membership. "The further allegation that he had in fact
been a member of the Party was surplusage, but proof of the fact of membership
might be relevant on the issue of his belief that he had been a member." Id. 248
(footnote omitted). See MODEL PENAL CODE §208.20, Comment at 117 (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1957) (criticizing as "disquieting" the Remington prosecution under
the above indictment).

106 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 907 (1952). The
trial court charged the jury that, in order to find membership in the Communist
Party, it was required to find that Remington "performed the act of joining the
party." Id. 248. The Second Circuit found the charge defective in failing to
specify what overt acts would "furnish a rational basis for inferring what the accused thought constituted membership" so that the accused's testimony could be
shown as false under the requisite standard of proof. Id. 248-50.
In petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari from the refusal of the Second
Circuit to dismiss the indictment, Remington pressed two claims. First, he argued
that the foreman of the grand jury that indicted him was collaborating with the
chief prosecution witness in a publishing venture whose success depended on
Remington's indictment. Second, he argued that the prosecutor deliberately withheld information about this collaboration from defendant's counsel and then sought
to suppress the information when it became known to defense counsel from other
sources. Remington v. United States, 343 U.S. 907 (1952). Certiorari was denied,
with Justices Black and Douglas dissenting. Id.
1o Testifying in his own defense at the first trial, Remington made five statements that became counts for perjury in the second indictment: (1) denial of
attendance at Communist Party meetings; (2) denial of delivery to one Elizabeth
Bentley of information to which she was not entitled; (3) denial that he had ever
paid Communist Party dues; (4) denial that he had ever solicited members for
the Communist Party; and (5) denial that he had any knowledge of the existence
of the Young Communist League at Dartmouth College where he had been a student from 1934 to 1939. Remington was convicted of counts two and five,
acquitted on count four, and the jury was unable to agree on counts one and
three. 208 F.2d at 568.
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sibly lured him into the commission of perjury at his first trial
and should thus be barred from prosecuting him for it. 08
Without deciding whether the government in fact was guilty
of misconduct before the first grand jury, a majority of the court
rejected Remington's "new and novel argument." 109 Finding that
there existed no causal connection between what happened in the
grand jury proceeding and Remington's testimony at his first trial,
the court concluded that Remington was under oath to speak the
truth and could not "lie with impunity." 110 The court found,
moreover, that Remington's asserted defense of entrapment had
only the most superficial applicability. In the majority's view, the
entrapment defense is available only when the defendant's criminal
design originates with the government and not with the accused.
To say that the government originated perjury when it questioned
Remington would be to permit entrapment to be invoked in every
case in which the government questions a witness and the witness
lies. The majority concluded that such a result not only would be
illogical but also would "weaken our judicial process." 11
Judge Hand viewed the matter differently. Observing that
"the present time is hardly a propitious season to abate [our]
vigilance" over the misuse of "unlimited and unchecked" govern112
mental power manifested by ex parte grand jury examination,
Judge Hand decried the manner in which the original perjury indictment was obtained. He focused on the government's outrageous treatment of Remington's wife, who was examined continuously for four hours about her husbands's connection with the
Communist Party. Mrs. Remington steadfastly resisted her interrogators, whose questions, in Judge Hand's view, often invaded the
marital privilege. She pleaded without avail for "something to
eat," that she was "tired," that her mind was "getting fuzzy," and
that she wanted to consult her lawyers, but the barrage of questioning continued. 113 Worn down, she finally capitulated and told the
108 Id.
109

Id.

11O Id. 569-70.

M Id. 570-71.
112

Id. 573.

By Mr. Donegan [the prosecutor]:
Q. Well, do we have to go through all this background? We are right
down to the issue right now, after all this time we have just reached the
question now. Why not answer that question, and then we'll postpone it
for another day; if you answer that question, we'll postpone it for another
113

day. That isn't going to involve you, is it? It couldn't involve you. All
you have to do is say yes or no as to whether that money was for the

Communist Party. And your yes or no isn't going to decide the issue, I'll
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examiners what they wanted to hear, namely, that her husband had
given money to the Communist Party.11 4 This critical piece of
testimony followed fast upon the coup de grace-the false admonition from the grand jury foreman, in the presence of the prosecutor,
that the witness had no privilege to refuse to answer a question,
-when in reality the question indeed involved a confidential communication between husband and wife that was privileged from
disclosure. 1" 5
Judge Hand scarcely suggested that a witness before a grand
jury should be coddled. "[F]aced with a patently unwilling wittell you that; it's something else that exists. You know that I wouldn't
ask you questions-you can't accuse me of fishing in here. I haven't
learned anything yet. A. Well, I don't want to answer.
By the Foreman:
Q. Mrs. Remington, I think that we have been very kind and considerate.
We haven't raised our voices and we haven't shown our teeth, have we?
Maybe you don't know about our teeth. A witness before a Grand Jury
hasn't the privilege of refusing to answer a question. You see, we haven't
told you that, so far. You have been asked a question. You must answer
it. If a witness doesn't answer a question, the Grand Jury has rather
unusual powers along that line. We are, to a certain extent, what you
might call a judicial body. We can't act, ourselves. Our procedure is,
when we get a witness who is contemptuous, who refuses to answer questions, to take them before a Judge. Now, at that point there will be a
private proceeding. He will instruct the witness to answer the question.
Then we come back here and put the question again. If the witness refuses to answer the question, we take him back to Court and the Judge
will find him in contempt of Court and sentence him to jail until he has
purged himself. "Purging," in that case, is answering the question. Now,
I have already pointed out to you that you have a question from the
Special Assistant to the Attorney General: Did your husband or did he
not give this money to the Communist Party? You have no privilege to
refuse to answer the question. I don't want at this time to-I said "showing teeth." I don't want them to bite you. But I do want you to know
that. And remember, you have a very sympathetic body here. We want
to avoid anything like that. I didn't mention, of course, the second proceeding before a jury is of course a public hearing. And I mention that
to you in fairness because I do know that you have a certain grave concern about what your obligations are, and I think in fairness to you we
should tell you that. And in view of the time and, I think, the empty
stomachs of all the Jurors-I know mine is very empty-I think we can
very quickly dispose of things if you will just proceed now. I think you
have in your heart answered the questions as to what your procedure
should be. (To Mr. Donegan) Do you want to put the question again?
Q. Can you find that question, Mr. Reporter? A. My answer is yes.
Id. 572 n.1.
114The incommunicado interrogation of Mrs. Remington strikingly resembles
police interrogation processes, which use psychological and other pressures to
overbear the will of the individual, forcing a confession of facts that the interrogators want to hear. The reliability of such a confession is clearly suspect. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, 488-90 (1964); 3 J.WIrGMoE, EvmENcE §833 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
115 208 F.2d at 573. See 8 J. WGMORE, EviDENcE §§ 2332-2341. (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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ness, the grand jury was free to press her cross-examination hard
and sharp; truth is more important than the sensibilities of the
witness." 116 The facts in Remington, however, disclosed deliberate
intimidation, overt threats, physical coercion, deceit, and relentless
interrogation, all of which, in Judge Hand's view, went beyond
what was permissible.
Because of the oppressive and deceitful treatment of Remington's wife, Judge Hand would have dismissed the indictment on
two separate grounds. First, relying on Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States,11 7 he invoked the familiar exclusionary doctrine
that denies the prosecution evidence that it has obtained unlawfully. "I do not see any difference in principle between obtaining
the first indictment by the unlawful extraction of evidence, necessary to its support, and obtaining a document by an unreasonable
search." 118 In both cases, the judge argued, the evidence and its
119
tainted fruit should be excluded to deter official lawlessness.
Second, distinct from traditional exclusionary rule theory,
Hand would have broadened the doctrine of entrapment to em120
brace Remington's case. Invoking Sorrells v. United States,
Judge Hand reasoned that the doctrine of entrapment embodies
"the repugnance of decent people at allowing officials to punish a
man for conduct that they have 'incited' or 'instigated,' and to
which by so doing they have made themselves accessories." 121 To
be sure, the government did not directly "incite" or "instigate"
Remington to repeat his grand jury testimony at his first trial.
Judge Hand, however, would not "so narrowly" confine the entrapment doctrine. 122 He noted that Remington had committed himself
in the grand jury to a denial of his membership in the Communist
Party. Consequently, Remington could not avoid repeating this
denial at his perjury trial. "[I]f he did not take the stand, it would
have been equivalent to a plea of guilty." 123 Judge Hand found
this compulsion, coupled with the government's misconduct in
securing the indictment for perjury, sufficient to constitute an entrapment defense. "[T]he question comes down to whether there
is any difference between the repugnance that decent people would
116 208 F.2d at 571.
117251 U.S. 385 (1920).
1182 08 F.2d at 575.
119 Id. 574.

120287 U.S. 435 (1932).
121208
122 Id.
123

Id.

F.2d at 575.
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feel at punishing a man for perjury the officials . . . persuaded him
to commit, and the repugnance they would feel if the officials induced him to perjure himself by securing an indictment for perjury
against him by illegal means ....
" 124
In sum, viewing, as Judge Hand did, the first grand jury proceeding as irretrievably tainted by flagrant governmental misconduct, two things follow: first, Remington's trial testimony was
"impelled" by that misconduct; 12- second, having solicited that
testimony wrongfully, the government should be estopped as a
matter of law from prosecuting him for it. Judge Hand's dissent
in Remington is a bold and imaginative effort to confront particularly offensive government behavior in the grand jury context. The
significant point is that the entrapment doctrine, ordinarily a very
narrow defense, was recognized as a due process defense to perjury.
Concededly, no overtly oppressive tactics were used by the
prosecutor in the hypothetical interrogation of White; hence no
due process claim could reasonably be advanced along the lines of
Hand's dissent. However, due process need not be so narrowly
construed. If, as argued above, a prosecutor subverts the grand
jury for an illegitimate purpose when he or she premeditatedly
elicits perjury, this conduct surely implicates due process just as if
the prosecutor elicited perjury by physical or psychological coercion.
Under the broadened definition of entrapment espoused by Judge
Hand, White could properly invoke due process as a bar to
prosecution.
B. A Perjury Ambush
As just discussed, Remington concerned the overall fairness of
the grand jury proceeding, specifically whether outrageous interrogation of a witness should excuse perjury. A premeditated attempt by the prosecutor to extract perjury was not at issue. That
subject was squarely faced four years later by the Eighth Circuit in
Brown v. United States.1 26 The defendant, Brown, a supervisory
official in the Internal Revenue Service's Office of Collection in
Chicago, was assigned to a task force to investigate alleged corruption by the Collector of Internal Revenue in St. Louis, Missouri.1 2T
Id.
See Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) (defendant's trial
testimony held to be "impelled," and therefore tainted, by the prosecution's use
of illegally obtained confession).
126 245 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1957).
127 The investigation was authorized by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
on the recommendation of Honorable George H. Moore, Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Id. 550.
124
125
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Brown was responsible for furnishing personnel for the investigation. At a meeting of the task force on May 3, 1950, Brown, in the
presence of three other government investigators, expressed disbelief
in allegations of misconduct by the Collector and suggested that the
complaints be spot checked. Two months later, after additional
meetings and discussions, the investigation concluded and a report
issued recommending certain operational changes in the Collector's
office but finding no evidence of misconduct. A second investigation conducted some six months later determined that the first investigation had been conducted in an honest, sincere, and intelli128
gent manner.
For reasons not clear from the record, a federal grand jury was
impaneled in Omaha, Nebraska four years later to investigate
whether the defendant and others had conspired to or otherwise
impeded any of the foregoing investigations. 129 Brown was ordered
to report to the local internal revenue office in Omaha, Nebraska
on a "special undisclosed assignment." On his arrival, he was
brought to the office of the United States Attorney and taken immediately into the grand jury room at which time he was interrogated for two hours about events that had occurred four years
earlier. 30 On the basis of his responses to questions relating to the
May 3 meeting, Brown was indicted on seven counts of perjury,
3
and a jury subsequently convicted him of four.1 '
128 Id. 551. The purpose of the second investigation, in which more than 260
government employees were interviewed, is not stated in the record. Apparently
there were allegations that the first investigation was dishonestly conducted. With
respect to the defendant, the report found that his role was limited to assigning
personnel to assist in the investigation "and that he in nowise influenced anyone
in the performance of it." Id.

129 Id.

130 Some 365 questions were put to the defendant in that period of time, most
regarding the May 3 meeting, and seven answers were chosen as the basis for the
perjury charges. The prosecutor, when questioning the defendant before the grand
jury, knew how the defendant and the other three parties to the May 3 meeting
remembered the conversation because each had already given a sworn statement to
a government investigator. Further, prior to Brown's testimony, the three other
participants had given the grand jury their version of the conversation. Id. 551,
555.
131 The questions and answers on which the defendant was convicted are:
"Count 1. Q. All right, sir, but, did you at any time that day or
evening, or at any time, state in words or substance, that these charges
that were made by Moore were preposterous or absurd? A. No, sir.
"Count 2. Q. As I have indicated to you, we are trying to find out
whether this thing was blocked, and if so, who did it, so I will ask you
this general question: Did you, Mr. Brown, do anything, or say anything,
on or prior to May 3rd, 1950, the date being the date when you were
in St. Louis on this occasion, intended or calculated to block or thwart,
impede or obstruct or prevent this investigation? A. No, sir.
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The court of appeals reversed the conviction on several
grounds. First, under the facts, the Nebraska grand jury had no
jurisdiction to inquire into matters occurring in Missouri. 132 The
court characterized the grand jury as a "roving commission" 133 and
34
condemned the United States Attorney's misuse of his power.
Second, the questions put to the witness were not material to the
grand jury investigation.1 5 The court reasoned that because the
grand jury lacked jurisdiction, any answers given by the defendant,
however false, could not logically relate to any matter relevant to
the grand jury's proper function. 136
Once it concluded that the grand jury was not functioning as
a competent tribunal and that Brown's false answers were not
material to any action that the grand jury properly could take, the
court went on to consider-although it need not have-the prose"Count 3. Q. Did you do anything or say anything on the 3rd, or
prior thereto, to try to influence these men to whitewash Finnegan or to
do an inadequate, superficial investigation? A. No, sir.
"Count 7. Q. I previously asked you whether you tried to minimize
the charges against Finnegan, or tried to influence them not to do a
proper investigation. A. No, sir.
"Q. You say that never happened; is that right? A. I never tried to
minimize the investigation; no, sir.
"Q. Or to minimize the charges? A. No, sir.
"Q. Or to influence them not to make a proper investigation? A. No,
Sir."
Id. 551-52 (footnote omitted). The court intimated that, apart from other considerations, the above questions might not support perjury charges. Id. 556.
Such questions appear to call for a subjective response by the witness of his understanding of the meaning of the words used. Terms like "influence," "minimize,"
"block," "thwart," "impede," and "obstruct" are extremely vague, particularly
when used as the basis for perjury charges. See Bronston v. United States, 409
U.S. 352, 362 (1973) (holding that under the federal perjury statute it is the
questioner's burden to frame his questions precisely); note 92 supra.
132 245 F.2d at 554-55. The government contended that the Nebraska grand
jury had jurisdiction because one of the witnesses to the May 3 meeting, following
his transfer to Omaha, had made written notations on a letter concerning the Collector. This letter, written in Nebraska, but never sent, was the "only link" to
justify jurisdiction of the Nebraska grand jury. Id. 552-53. In response to the
defendant's motion for acquittal, the district court observed that the Nebraska
grand jury investigation "came, in my opinion, perilously close to being a fraud
on the jurisdiction of this court." Id. 553. Nonetheless, the court found that the
significance of the letter, although "almost trivial," id., "could possibly have been
articulated into a conspiratorial program." Id.
133 Id. 555.
134The court commented: "We have not encountered any instances in this
Circuit where any [prosecutor] has made such use of a grand jury as that resorted
to here." Id.
a35 Id.
136 Id.
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cutor's motivation in haling Brown before the grand jury. The
court noted that the prosecutor (1) possessed sworn statements of
each party, including Brown, who participated in the May 3, 1950
meeting; (2) knew that the defendant's recollection of the meeting
differed from that of the others present, and (3) had already caused
the others to testify to their version before the grand jury. 18 7 With
this background, the prosecutor's premeditated design was readily
apparent-namely, to elicit testimony from the defendant with the
sole purpose to indict him for perjury. "Extracting the testimony
from defendant had no tendency to support any possible action of
the grand jury within its competency. The purpose to get him indicted for perjury and nothing else is manifest beyond all reasonable doubt." 188

Although the Brown opinion is not altogether clear on this
point, it appears that the court would have reached the same result
even if the Nebraska grand jury had not been a self-constituted
"roving commission" without proper jurisdictional power. To repeat, the prosecutor had sworn statements from all parties to the
May 3 meeting when he questioned Brown. The court stated that
this prevented the defendant's answers from having any capacity to
support even a proper grand jury action. A fair reading of the
Brown opinion therefore suggests two independent rationales: first,
that a perjury prosecution will not lie if the grand jury lacks any
authority, thus rendering the questions and answers immaterial;
second, that regardless of jurisdiction and materiality, it is impermissible to extract testimony from a witness for the sole purpose
89
of indicting him for perjury.
137Id.

138 Id.
189 Federal district judges have found perjury traps in three other cases dealing
with perjury in settings other than the grand jury.
United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956), involved an inves-

tigation into the disappearance and death of a military officer while on assignment

in Italy in 1944 conducted by a special subcommittee of the House of Repre-

sentatives. The subcommittee was properly looking into whether existing laws
adequately covered the prosecution of such crimes and whether the Department of
Defense had functioned adequately in its investigation of the disappearance. The
subcommittee had received evidence that Icardi was responsible for the homicide;
it also possessed exculpatory statements that Icardi had given previously before
several investigative bodies. Icardi appeared before the subcommittee and freely
answered the questions, basically reiterating his former statements. The court concluded, based on the testimony of the committee chairman, that Icardi was called
as a witness in order either to provide him with a forum to exonerate himself or
to put him under oath with a view towards extracting a perjury indictment, neither
of which was a valid legislative purpose. Accordingly, the subcommittee was not
acting as a competent tribunal. Even assuming competency of the tribunal, how-

ever, the indictment was defective because Icardi's answers were immaterial to
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Brown is thus squarely on point with the White-Singer example. To be sure, the grand jury in the White hypothetical presumably had jurisdiction to interrogate White about corruption.
With knowledge of the tape recording, the prosecutor in good faith
could have probed White for information of corruption. The
prosecutor did not do this, however. As in Brown, the prosecutor
had evidence of a prior suspicious conversation involving White,
had submitted that evidence to the grand jury, and knew that White
faced the dilemma of admitting his embarrassing statements or
lying. As in Brown, the prosecutor evinced no interest in interrogating White about his knowledge of corruption, but instead
focused on the outward details of the conversation. The prosecutor's questions were ambiguous, and occasionally tricky. He
furnished the witness no cues to stimulate recall, if indeed White
was sincerely forgetful. From all of these considerations, the conclusion is irresistable that White, like Brown, was ambushed for
perjury.
the subject matter of the investigation. Before Icardi was summoned, the subcommittee had in its possession all the information necessary to write its report,
including Icardi's version of the event. Icardi bad three testimonial options: to
remain silent, to confess guilt, or to repeat his earlier denial of guilt. Whatever
option Icardi chose, it could have no meaningful effect on the subject matter of the
investigation.
In United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303 (D.D.C. 1959), the defendant, a
union official, was recalled before a senate committee investigating improper practices of labor unions and asked questions concerning alleged assaults on dissident
union officials. As in Icardi, the committee had before it substantial evidence contradicting Cross's denials as well as an earlier flat denial by the witness himself.
The court reasoned that nothing Cross could say would materially assist the committee. If Cross adhered to his earlier denial, the committee gained no additional
facts. If Cross made admissions, it would merely corroborate information already
before the committee. If Cross refused to testify, the committee learned nothing.
In short, Cross was recalled "for the purpose of emphasizing the untruthfulness of
his prior denial and to render him more liable to criminal prosecution" for perjury.
Id. 309. Moreover, because the committee sought to elicit facts more properly the
duty of a prosecutor or committing magistrate, it was not pursuing a bona fide
legislative purpose and therefore was not acting as a competent tribunal.
In United States v. Thayer, 214 F. Supp. 929 (D. Colo. 1963), neither the
competency of the tribunal-the Securities and Exchange Commission-nor the
materiality of the inquiry into the defendant's representations to prospective purchasers of stock were at issue. The question, as in Remington, was whether the
methods used by the government in obtaining testimony demonstrated unfairness
of a sufficient magnitude to require dismissal of the indictment. Among the considerations deemed relevant by the court were the recalling of the defendant before
the Commission one month after he had already testified, with at least an anticipation that he might perjure himself; the failure to warn adequately the defendant that a perjury charge was being contemplated and would follow if the
defendant persisted in giving false responses; "zeroing in" on the witness without his realization of the true import of the inquiry, and the "disparity of knowledge
as between the Government and the accused." Id. 933. The court observed:
"If it should appear that the Government was substantially certain prior to the April
19th hearing that the defendant would give false answers, it would then follow
that the testimony so induced should not be received in evidence." Id. 932.
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C. The Subjective Approach to the Perjury Trap
judge Hand's reference to due process doctrine in his Remington dissent and the Eighth Circuit's discussion in Brown of prosecutorial purpose and materiality suggest that the entrapment defense theoretically is available in cases in which the interrogator
uses oppressive or deceitful tactics to procure perjury. The majority view of entrapment, however, focuses on the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. Under this standard, the courts
generally have rejected the entrapment defense to perjury.
Thus, consistent with the majority opinion in Remington, the
Seventh Circuit stated: "[I]t was defendant's predisposition to lie
his way out of his difficulties that led to this crime. The Government did not solicit or encourage perjury; at most it created a
situation in which perjury appeared expedient." 140 Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit held that "(w)hile the United States Attorney, by
inviting the defendant to testify before the grand jury, may have
provided defendant with the opportunity to commit perjury, the
record is absolutely devoid of any evidence that the United States
Attorney suggested what defendant should say when he testified." 141
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit stated that "[the witness] was forced to
tell what he knew about the alleged events. He was not forced,
induced, or coerced, however, into giving false testimony before the
grand jury." 142 Finally, the Second Circuit held that "[t]here is no
slightest indication that the government instigated the false testimony or implanted the idea of lying in [the witness's] mind." 143
Although factually accurate, these statements are beside the
point. It is illogical to apply to perjury a subjective "predisposition" test of entrapment. The defendants in the above cases did
not claim that the government "implanted the idea of lying" in
their minds, secured false testimony by threats, or suggested what
they should say. Rather, the claim is that, regardless of the witness's
predisposition, the government's conduct in baiting the witness into
perjury is a perversion of the grand jury's function and should not
be permitted.
140United States v. Nickels, 502 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1974) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976).
141 United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213, 230 (4th Cir. 1973) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
142 United States v. Lazaros, 480 F.2d 174, 179 (6th Cir. 1973) (emphasis in
original), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974).
143United States v. Fiorillo, 376 F.2d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 1967) (emphasis
added).
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The illogic of. analyzing perjury in terms of predisposition is
illustrated by United States v. Lazaros,14 a decision by the Sixth
Circuit. The defendant, Lazaros, an informant for the federal
government, told an investigator with the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) that several IRS officials and two former Detroit city officials
had accepted illegal payoffs from underworld figures1 4 5 The investigator believed Lazaros, 146 but warned him that false statements
violated federal law. 147 A grand jury was impaneled to investigate
the charges. Lazaros was called as a witness but refused to testify,
asserting a not unreasonable fear for his life. 148 He was granted
immunity, persisted in his refusal, was held in civil contempt, and
finally purged himself by answering the prosecutor's questions. 149
Based on his answers, Lazaros was indicted and convicted of twelve
counts of perjury.
On appeal, Lazaros claimed that the government extracted
testimony from him solely to charge him with perjury. Apparently,
the accused officials had testified and denied Lazaros's accusation
prior to his testifying.150 Moreover, the prosecutor admitted that
by the time Lazaros testified, the government had concluded that
all of the officials accused by him were innocent of his charges. 1' 1
Indeed, when Lazaros testified, the grand jury probe "was nearly
complete."

152

153
The court rejected Lazaros's claim that he was entrapped.
In the court's view, Lazaros might have been compelled by the

F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974).
175-76. Lazaros stated that he observed these individuals receive envelopes containing money at a Christmas party.
146 Id. 175.
14718 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976)
states that "[wihoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . .makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations"
is punishable
by up to five years imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000.
148 Lazaros claimed, and it was not disputed, that another government informant
had been killed by poisoning while in the county jail one week earlier. 480 F.2d
at 176 n.3.
149 Id. 175-76. Lazaros testified to the same facts that he had previously told
the IRS; namely, that he personally witnessed corrupt payments to public officials.
144480
45Id.

16o Id. 175.

151 Id. 177.
152Id.
153 The court also rejected the claim that Lazaros's testimony was coerced.
Lazaros contended that if he persisted in refusing to testify and went to jail, he
would be killed; that if he testified that no bribe had taken place he would be
indicted, under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976), for giving false statements to a government official, and that if he retold the story he had given to the IRS he would
be convicted of perjury. The court said that this defense was presented to the
jury and it found against Lazaros. 480 F.2d at 176. The court also concluded,
without analysis, that Lazaros "apparently" could not have been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). 480 F.2d at 176 n.4.
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government to give testimony, but he was not compelled to give
false testimony.'6 4 He was neither innocent nor not predisposed
to lie.155 Moreover, it was entirely proper for the prosecutor to
question Lazaros before the grand jury: his testimony was "clearly
material" to the investigation.566 Lazaros was the "main accuser"
of the government officials and his testimony related to the legitimate scope of the investigation. 1'5 Consequently, the grand jury
was entitled to summon him for questioning.
Under the reasoning in Lazaros, the Sixth Circuit would probably also reject White's entrapment defense. The hypothetical
interrogation related to arguably corrupt advice given by White to
an individual under investigation and, therefore, the Lazaros court
would conclude, was material. There is no indication that the
prosecutor suggested what White should say or that White was not
predisposed to lie. Accordingly, the court would find that the entrapment defense was not available.
Denying Lazaros and White the entrapment defense, however,
is unfair, particularly because an entrapment formula that looks to
the defendant's predisposition is meaningless in the perjury context.15s

In contrast, variations of entrapment that address the

government's conduct-the objective and due process tests-are more
meaningful. Under such tests, Lazaros and White might have valid
defenses. The inquiry would be directed at the prosecutor's purpose and methods of questioning the witness. Specifically, it would
seek to determine whether the procedure was an honest effort to
secure meaningful information, or whether it was a deliberate attempt to bait the witness into perjury. Thus, a principal inquiry
would be the importance of Lazaros's or White's testimony to the
investigation. This conclusion would be important in assessing
the prosecutor's purpose in questioning the witness. If the prosecutor interrogated either Lazaros or White without a sincere belief
that his testimony would further the investigation, the question
naturally arises why he was summoned. When a prosecutor does
not expect to obtain any meaningful information, there is at least
a suggestion that his purpose was to elicit perjury. This suggestion
becomes an almost irresistible conclusion if the prosecutor secretly
holds evidence that he knows will contradict the witness's testimony.
154 Id. 179.
155 Id.
256 Id. 178.
157

Id. 177.

158 See text following note 78 supra.
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By emphasizing the witness's predisposition to lie and discounting the government's conduct in setting the perjury trap, the
courts, despite their theoretical role as supervisory bodies to ensure
fairness in the grand jury, in practice condone prosecutorial overreaching. Brown suggested that perjury may be excused if elicitation of perjury was the government's sole purpose in questioning
the witness. 1 9 As Lazaros implicitly demonstrates, however, the
Brown test is an exceedingly difficult standard to meet. 160 Further,
in weighing a claim of dishonest prosecutorial conduct against a
conceded predisposition to lie, the courts might be expected to side
with the prosecutor.
The First Circuit's decision in United States v. Chevoor16 1
illustrates this point. In the course of an investigation into loansharking activities, the government electronically intercepted a conversation between the defendant, Chevoor, apparently a loanshark
victim, and Pellicci, a target of the investigation, in which usurious
payments were discussed. When questioned by a federal investigator who served him with a grand jury subpoena, Chevoor made
denials that were contradicted by the intercepted recording. Chevoor was told that he was not a target of the investigation, that
the government had reason to believe that he was not telling the
truth, and that he could be expected to be prosecuted for perjury
if he persisted in his denials before the grand jury. He was not
informed of the recorded conversation nor that he could remain
silent and avail himself of the assistance of counsel. Before the
grand jury the same questions were asked and Chevoor made the
same denials that resulted in his being indicted for perjury. 16 2
The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that
the prosecutor's "prime purpose" in questioning Chevoor before
the grand jury was "to get him to testify falsely under oath." 163
Moreover, despite the government's assurances, the court felt that
Chevoor was a "potential, if not probable, grand jury target." 16
159 See text accompanying notes 126-39 supra.
160 This is particularly true if the court has adopted an expansive view of
materiality. See cases cited note 97 supra.

161526 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
162 Id. 179. The indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979)
alleged that Chevoor made material false statements with respect to whether he
"had ever owed money to Pellicci; whether he had ever discussed with Pellicci
payments due the latter; and whether he had ever discussed with Pellicci the fact
that other individuals owed Pellicci money." Id.
103 United States v. Chevoor, 392 F. Supp. 436, 442 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 526
F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
164 Id. 439.
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0 5
As such, he should have been advised of his right to remain silent.
For the district court, this failure to advise Chevoor of his rights,
coupled with refusal to apprise him of the intercepted recording,
"ensnared" the witness in a situation in which he would inevitably
become a defendant. That is, Chevoor could be indicted for violating a federal statute 166 if he testified inconsistently with the
statements he gave the federal investigator, and he could be indicted
for perjury if he testified consistently with those statements. 67 "By
forcing the defendant to testify, without alerting him in any way
as to his precarious position, the Government turned the screw
too tightly . . . ." 1
The court of appeals reversed the district court and reinstated
the indictment. 69 Although the court had "considerable sympathy"
for the lower court's view of the defendant's plight ' 70-- the unknown
interception; his prior denial of that conversation; government assurances that he was not a target; summonses without warnings for
the purpose of asking him the same questions he previously had
denied-it did not view the defendant as impaled on the horns of
the trilemma of perjury, self-incrimination, or contempt. "We
have concluded that Chevoor faced only the alternatives of perjury
or telling the truth. Self-incrimination was not a foreseeable possibility and, therefore, there was no right to remain silent as to
which he should have been warned." "7' Further, the witness was
not summoned with the "sole purpose" of extracting perjury from
him. 7 2 The grand jury was conducting a "legitimate investigation"
and although "the government did not entirely cooperate with
Chevoor . . . it is not required to do so." 173 Finally, even though

Id.
See note 147 supra.
167 392 F. Supp. at 441-42.
165

166

168

Id. 442.

169 United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425

U.S. 935 (1976).
170 Id. 182.
171 Id. The court of appeals concluded that Chevoor was not liable for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) on the ground that his denials to the investigators were not "statements" within the contemplation of that statute. Nothing
in the record, however, indicates that Chevoor was aware that "[slelf-incrimination was not a foreseeable possibility." 526 F.2d at 182. The government neither
advised him of this right, nor of the inapplicability of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976),
nor of his right to remain silent. For all that Chevoor knew, he faced only the

options of perjury, self-incrimination, or contempt.
172

526 F.2d at 185.

173

Id. The court noted that the prosecutor advised Chevoor prior to his testi-

mony that he bad reason to believe Chevoor was lying, and added that if Chevoor

committed perjury he could be expected to be prosecuted for it. Id.
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the government might have expected Chevoor to perjure himself, 74
it was not impermissible to call him to testify. "[I]t was possible
(even though unlikely) that when it came to the crunch of testifying
under oath, with a transcript, Chevoor would succumb to the
truth." 175 Nor did the government's actions reach the level of inexcusable conduct that Judge Learned Hand condemned in Remington.7 1 In sum, because the government's conduct was not unduly deceitful or coercive, and because the witness deliberately lied,
the defense of entrapment was not available. 77
Chevoor illustrates the difficulty of assessing the fairness of
grand jury interrogation leading to perjury. As the victim of a
loanshark operation, Chevoor presumably possessed relevant information about persons engaged in such crime. Chevoor was not a
target of the investigation-the prosecutor "had no ax to grind"
with him. 178

Under these circumstances, there is every reason to

expect the prosecutor to strenuously seek truthful testimony and
not attempt to trap the witness into committing perjury. 7 9
174 Id.
17 Id.
176 Id. See text accompanying notes 112-25 supra.
177 1n United States v. Mandujano, 496 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd,

425 U.S. 564 (1976), the court of appeals affirmed an order of the district court
suppressing allegedly perjurious grand jury testimony on the ground that the questioning of the defendant before the grand jury "smacked of entrapment." Id.
1053. The government knew, prior to calling Mandujano before the grand jury,
that the witness had discussed the purchase of narcotics with a federal agent.
In questioning Mandujano, the prosecutor precisely tracked the facts of the contact between the agent and Mandujano. According to the court of appeals,
Mandujano was a "putative defendant," and the government should have advised
him both of his status and of his right to remain silent. The prosecutor "must
have known" that any answer Mandujano gave to the questions would be either
self-incriminating or perjurious. It was unlikely that Mandujano would confess to
a crime. Thus, "[tihe inference is easily drawn that the attorney's questioning was
primarily baiting Mandujano to commit perjury." Id. 1055. This was a "totally unfair procedure," so far "beyond the pale of permissible prosecutorial conduct" that
it represented a due process violation and, accordingly, the Fifth Circuit felt that
the testimony should have been suppressed. Id. 1058.
The Supreme Court reversed. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564
(1976). The Court found that Mandujano was sufficiently warned of his rights
and, in any event, was "sworn to tell the truth before a duly constituted grand
jury . . . [and therefore] will not be heard to call for suppression of false statements made to the jury." Id. 582. Citing Brown v. United States, 245 F.2d
549 (8th Cir. 1957), the Court stated that "nothing remotely akin to 'entrapment'
or abuse of process is suggested by what occurred here."
See also United States v. Wong, 553 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 431
U.S. 174 (1977) (Ninth Circuit's holding that grand jury witness vulnerable to
incrimination or perjury should be given Miranda warnings reversed on ground
that failure to advise witness about rights does not excuse perjury).
178 Lalocca v. United States, 337 F.2d 39, 42 (8th Cir. 1964).
179 To be sure, it is possible that a witness indicted for perjury might be more
amenable to cooperate with the government than one not so indicted. Even as-
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It is unclear from the record why the government did not make
a greater effort to induce Chevoor to tell the truth, for example,
by actually disclosing the existence of evidence that would prove
his denials false.18 0 It might be that the government believed that
by disclosing the existence of the tape recording it would be violating secrecy requirements,"8" although this is doubtful. 8 2 It might
also be that it was feared that such disclosure would impede the
investigation by providing the witness with a chance to tailor his
testimony to evidence already in the government's possession. 8 3
The latter appears to be the more likely explanation for the government's reticence.
The court's treatment of the prosecutor's failure to advise
Chevoor of his right to remain silent is also troubling. A grand
jury witness ordinarily has no constitutional right to a warning of
his rights.

84

Nonetheless, warnings are virtually always given,1es a

practice widely approved by commentators.8 6 Further, such warnings would have been particularly appropriate-indeed, perhaps
necessary-in Ghevoor's case. Chevoor's prior statements to the
government investigator strongly suggested that he would lie before
the grand jury. This was particularly likely in light of the possibility, recognized by the district court, that Chevoor could be
prosecuted for his false statements to the government investigator. 8 7
suming, however, that the government might use the perjury indictment as leverage
to induce cooperation, it should be able to demonstrate the necessity of this course
of action. Further, the government would presumably prefer truthful and uncoerced testimony to testimony compelled under the threat of a perjury prosecution.
180 The courts do not require that a prosecutor inform a witness of contradictory evidence, either in the form of recorded evidence or live witness testimony.
See cases cited note 98 supra.
181 United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 1965) ("it would
appear that the Federal Rules [FED. R. Cmn.
P. 6(e)] prohibit such disclosure");
People v. Breindel, 73 Misc. 2d 734, 739, 342 N.Y.S.2d 428, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1973)
("Such disclosure also jeopardizes the secrecy of the investigation and hence its
chances of success with respect to the targets thereof."), aff'd, 45 A.D.2d 691,
356 N.Y.S.2d 626, aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 928, 324 N.E.2d 545, 365 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1974).
82
1183
See text accompanying notes 267 & 268 infra.
People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d 240, 249, 385 N.E.2d 1218, 1223, 413
N.Y.S.2d 288, 294 (1978) ("Nor should the prosecutor be required to confront
defendant with the recording, lest he conform his testimony to what was already
known and fail to add to the prosecutor's knowledge."); People v. Breindel, 73
Misc. 2d 734, 739, 342 N.Y.S.2d 428, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1973) ("Providing an unco-operative or hostile witness with the type of information requested in this case
permits him to tailor his testimony to matters already known to the Grand Jury,
thereby defeating the purpose of calling him."), aft'd, 45 A.D.2d 691, 356 N.Y.S.2d
626, aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 928, 324 N.E.2d 545, 365 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1974).
184 See notes 34, 35 & 38 supra.
185 See note 88 supra.
186 See note 38 supra.
187 392 F. Supp. at 440. The court of appeals extensively considered whether
an exculpatory no" was within the purview of a false statement within the mean-
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As noted above, a prosecutor generally has no constitutional duty
to warn a grand jury witness of his rights. Nonetheless, the prosecutor's unexplained deviation from ordinary practices and the particular vulnerability of Chevoor permit an inference that the failure
to give protective warnings was part of an attempt to procure
perjury. In sum, in certain circumstances, the absence of warnings
by a prosecutor may be a relevant consideration for purposes of
perjury trap analysis.
White could not claim, as Chevoor did, that the failure to
advise him of his rights circumstantially suggests a premeditated
design to secure perjury. White was fully advised of his rights and
was assisted by counsel. Nor could a prosecutor exploit inexperience in a witness of White's sophistication as easily as he might if
dealing with a less knowledgeable or sophisticated witness. Chevoor,
however, is relevant to White's case in that it demonstrates how a
prosecutor, forcing the witness either to admit having made corrupt
statements or falsely to deny having made them, and having prepared a foundation to prove the witness's denial false, might bait
the witness into the trap.
D. New York's More Enlightened Approach
In keeping with their restrictive approaches to entrapment, the
courts have limited the availability of the entrapment defense in
perjury cases to situations in which the procedure unduly oppressed
witnesses' 88 or deceived the grand jury. 89 This approach is predictable first, because of the distorted focus on the witness's predisposition and second, because of the harsh attitude towards
perjury. Without condoning perjury, however, the courts could
assess properly the conduct of the prosecutor in deciding whether
to abort a prosecution because of unfairness.
Over the past several years New York state courts have considered the issue of the perjury trap with increasing attention and
alarm. At least two reasons exist for this trend. First, the proing of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
Although the court concluded that such a
response was not covered by the statute, a fair reading of the discussion suggests
that the question is far from clear or settled, as the prosecutor conceded on appeal.
526 F.2d at 180 n.3. In any event, this appears beside the point. The proper
inquiry should be whether the witness at the time reasonably viewed himself as
subject to incrimination. It is in this situation that the failure to advise the witness
of his rights becomes crucial. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
188E.g., United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953).
189 E.g., Brown v. United States, 245 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1957).
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liferation of special prosecutors and special grand juries 190 has required the courts, in their role as supervisors of the grand jury, to
carefully scrutinize the work of these bodies.19 1 Second, the indictments by these grand juries of several prominent figures on charges
of perjury192 understandably invited judicial concern, particularly
with regard to allegations of misuse of power by prosecutors involved in the highly competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
The dismissals by lower courts of several of these perjury indict193
ments on grounds of entrapment has underscored the alarm.
190 In the past eight years, governors of New York have appointed special
prosecutors and special grand juries to investigate corruption in the New York
City criminal justice system, N.Y. Code of Rules and Regulations tit. 9, §§ 1.55-59
(1972); to investigate the New York State nursing home industry, id. § 3.4 (1975);
to inquire into the Attica State Prison rebellion, id. § 1.78 (1973); to investigate
alleged wrongdoing by a police commissioner, a district attorney, and members
of their respective staffs, id. § 3.14 (1975) and to investigate political corruption
in Onondaga County, id. § 3.42 (1976).
191 The courts have had to pass on numerous issues ranging, for example, from
the power of the grand jury to investigate a particular subject matter, Dondi v.
Jones, 40 N.Y.2d 8, 351 N.E.2d 650, 386 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1976); the enforceability
of subpoenas, Cunningham v. Nadjari, 39 N.Y.2d 314, 347 N.E.2d 915, 383
N.Y.S.2d 590 (1976); Sigety v. Hynes, 38 N.Y.2d 260, 342 N.E.2d 518, 379
N.Y.S.2d 724 (1975), and the validity of indictments for perjury stemming from
these special investigations, People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 264, 385 N.E.2d 1231,
413 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1978); People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d 240, 385 N.E.2d 1218,
413 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1978).
19 2 See notes 12-14 supra & accompanying text.

193 In People v. Monaghan, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1975, at 8, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 1056, 391 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1977), perjury charges against George
Monaghan, an attorney and former New York City Police Commissioner, were dismissed on the ground that the prosecutor's questions before the grand jury were
designed to trap Monaghan into committing perjury rather than furthering the
grand jury's investigation. The grand jury had been investigating whether certain
persons had conspired to extort money from an individual named Olsberg.
Monaghan, in his capacity as an attorney, was present at a meeting when alleged
threats against Olsberg were made. Olsberg, acting under the prosecutor's authority, tape recorded the meeting. Monaghan was called before the grand jury,
granted immunity, and questioned about the statements. His denials led to an
indictment for perjury. In dismissing the indictment, the court found that
Monaghan, an old man, was unable to recall clearly the events of several months
earlier, and the prosecutor did little to refresh his recollection. The transcript of
the testimony, reprinted in the opinion, revealed a witness who "was ready to
testify fully with candor" but was not permitted to by the prosecutor because
"[w]hat was being sought was the color of a false statement on which to predicate
an indictment." Id. 9, col. 3 (citation omitted).
In People v. Blumenthal, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 16, 1976, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 13, 389 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1976), appeal denied, 41 N.Y.2d
1011, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1977), Albert Blumenthal, majority leader of the
New York State Assembly, was indicted for perjury based on statements allegedly made at a meeting in the Office of the State Department of Health
concerning the issuance of a nursing home license. The grand jury was looking
into irregularities in the issuance of the license, but found no evidence of criminal
activity. Rather than examining the defendant about the event, the prosecutor
questioned the defendant about testimony he had given before another investigating
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It was not until three cases were heard by the New York Court
of Appeals,'9 however, that the troubling and complex issue of the
perjury trap crystallized and, as a consequence, provided the impetus for that court to fashion coherent and meaningful standards.
The three cases involved the same basic issue: whether the prosecutor interrogated the witness in the legitimate pursuit of evidence
or the illegitimate pursuit of perjury. The witnesses were a supplier of paper goods to nursing homes (Pomerantz), a bailbond
agent (Schenkman), and a judge of the Supreme Court of the State
of New York (Tyler). As to Pomerantz and Schenkman, the court
found the interrogation proper; as to Tyler, the court found the
interrogation improper.
Joshua Pomerantz, a paper goods supplier of a number of
nursing homes in the New York metropolitan area, was summoned
by a special grand jury investigating abuses in the Medicaid reimbursement program including the payment of "kickbacks" by suppliers to nursing home owners. Ten months earlier, the special
prosecutor secretly recorded a conversation between Ira Feinberg,
a nursing home owner operating as an undercover agent, and
Pomerantz. During the conversation, Pomerantz described an "arrangement" involving a percentage of the monthly bill to the home,
fictitious invoices, and "special deals," presumably referring to a
body. The court, in dismissing the perjury counts, found that "the whole purpose
[in questioning Blumenthal] was to frame [a perjury] indictment." Id. 8, col. 4.
In People v. Brust, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2, 1976, at 12, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.), Joseph
Brust, a justice of the Supreme Court of New York, was questioned before a special grand jury about whether certain of his judicial actions had been corruptly
influenced. He was indicted for giving false answers. The defendant, an elderly
and ill man, was questioned before the grand jury about a conversation he had
with a city councilman seven months earlier. The conversation, wiretapped with
court approval, concerned a request by Brust to the councilman for personal favors
at a time when the councilman represented a party in an important case being
heard by Brust. The court, however, found that the interrogation of Brust was
calculated solely to develop and preserve perjury counts. Brust was questioned
about details that had occurred several months earlier, there was a legitimate possibility of honest memory lapses, and the prosecutor did nothing to refresh the
witness's recollection. In sum, the prosecutor did not ask specific questions directed
at developing accurate information but, rather, set out to trap the witness into lies.
In People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1980), Paul Rao, Jr., a
lawyer, was called before a grand jury investigating corruption in New York City
and interrogated about a mock crime that the prosecutor had invented as a means
of investigating official corruption. Rao's answers, contradicted by tape recordings,
formed the basis of the perjury counts of which he was convicted by a jury. In
dismissing the indictment, the court concluded that the questions put to him were
not material to any investigation into corruption but, rather, were "tailored . .
solely to entice and trap him into giving false answers." Id. 98, 425 N.Y.S.2d
at 129.
194People v. Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d 232, 385 N.E.2d 1214, 413 N.Y.S.2d
284 (1978); People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d 240, 385 N.E.2d 1218, 413 N.Y.S.2d
288 (1978); People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 385 N.E.2d 1224, 413 N.Y.S.2d 295
(1978).
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"kickback" scheme. 195 Granted transactional immunity before the
grand jury, Pomerantz was asked whether he had ever solicited
business from a nursing home owner with the understanding that a
percentage could be added onto the bill by the owner and whether
he had ever met or solicited business from Ira Feinberg.196 Based
195 People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d at 244, 385 N.E.2d at 1220, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 291.
1"The interrogation of Pomerantz with respect to Feinberg follows:
"Q. Have you ever done any business or solicited any business from
the Manor Nursing Home in Emerson, New Jersey?
"A. I don't remember.
"Q. That is run by a Mr. Ira Feinberg?
"A. I don't recall.
"Q. Have you ever met Mr. Feinberg?
"A. I don't remember.
"Q. Mr. Feinberg also runs the Manor Nursing Home in Tenafy,
New Jersey?
"A. I don't know where Tenafly is.
"Q. Well, have you ever met Mr. Feinberg?
"A. I don't remember.

"Q. Is it possible?
"A. Sure, it is possible."

"Q. Once again I want to ask you whether you have ever met or
solicited business from Mr. Ira Feinberg who had or has nursing home interests in among others the Manor Nursing Home at Tenafly, New Jersey,
and the Manor Nursing Home in Emerson, New Jersey?
"A. I don't remember, I don't remember, the name does not strikethe name, I don't remember the name.
"Q. Is it possible?
"A. It is-sure, it is possible.
"Q. Well, how likely is it?
"A. I don't know.
"Q. Do you have any recollections at all of meeting Mr. Ira Feinberg?
"A. None at all. I don't know where those places are."
"Q. Have you ever heard of or do you have any personal knowledge of
the alleged practice in the nursing home industry of vendors inflating their
bills to nursing homes?
"A. Just what I read in the papers.
"Q. You have no personal knowledge of that practice?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. You have never engaged in that practice yourself?
"A. No, no sir.
"Q. Have you ever heard or do you have any personal knowledge
of the alleged practice in the nursing home industry of vendors giving
extra bills or invoices to nursing homes?
"A. Just what I read in the paper.
"Q. You have never engaged in that practice yourself?
"A. No."
"Q. I want to be very clear on this, to the best of your knowledge
has any nursing home owner, operator, administrator, or other employee
that you have solicited business from ever in words or substance requested
or asked you for any special deals so that he can make a few dollars?
"A. I cannot remember every person who I dealt with in business if
that ever came across."
"Q. Mr. Pomerantz, have you ever said, suggested, or told any nursing
home owner, operator, administrator, or other employee in words or substance that he can have 10%added onto his bills?
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on his denials to both of these inquiries, Pomerantz was indicted
and convicted of perjury.
Ida Schenkman was summoned before a grand jury investigating the crimes of criminal usury and extortion in connection with
two $1000 payments that she allegedly made to Vincent Rizzo, a
suspected "loanshark," nine and four months earlier. The prosecutor learned of the transactions through an intercepted telephone
conversation between Rizzo and a third party. Granted transactional immunity, Schenkman was extensively interrogated about
the loans.197 At times evasive, she tacitly conceded that the loans
"A. You've asked me the question four times already.
"Q. Please answer. This will be the last time in that form at least.
"A. I must say I don't recollect ever having offered anyone in any way
any type of kickback."
"Q. Have you ever said, suggested, or acknowledged in any way to
any nursing home owner, operator, administrator, or other employee that
you would add on 10% on their bills and then give them back the 10% in
cash?
"A. I cannot recall making such a statement
"Q. If you had made such a statement you would recall it, would you
not?
"A. I sure would.

"Q.I want you to listen to my questions very carefully because they
are different Have you ever told any nursing home owner, operator, administrator, or other employee in effect that you give other people in the
nursing home industry 10% inflated bills?
"A. To the best of my recollection I don't remember ever making such
a statement.
"Q.Have you ever said, suggested, or told any nursing home owner,
operator, administrator, or other employee that when you make such deals
it is on that basis, meaning on the basis of a 10% inflated bill?
"A. To the best of my recollection I don't remember making such a
statement"
Id. at 245-47, 385 N.E.2d at 1221-22, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 291-92.
197
Schenkman was asked more than 1000 questions, a "significant portion" relating to the Rizzo loans. The following is illustrative:
"Q.Did you ever pay [Rizzo] $1,000 at one time on this loan?
"A. Did I ever pay him back a 1,000?
"Q. Yes, on this particular loan?
"A. No, I don't think so. I don't remember, I will be honest with
you, I really dont.
"Q. * * * on March 28, 1972, did you pay a person called Fatso
$1,000?
"A. I don't remember. I really don't.
"Q. Did you tell Vincent Bizzo that you did?
"A. I dont remember.
"Q.
"-.
"Q.
"A.

Do you remember giving him $1,000?
Yes, I do.
You did give him $1,000?
Yes, but I don't know what date.

"Q. How often have you paid Vincent Rizzo $1,000 at one time?
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had been made but testified that she could not recall the precise
dates or the purpose of the transactions, nor did she have any records
to assist her recollection. 198 On account of her responses, she was
indicted for perjury and contempt and convicted of contempt. 199
Andrew Tyler was summoned before a special grand jury investigating corruption in the New York City criminal justice system.
The grand jury was investigating, inter alia, Tyler's relationship
with certain gambling figures, including Raymond "Spanish Raymond" Marquez, reputed head of one of the largest gambling syndi"A. Not very often.
"Q. How many times?
"A. Oh, on two or three occasions.
"Q. Within the past year? Within the past, say from October 1971
to the present, how many times have you paid him $1,000?
"A. Maybe twice.
"Q. Okay. You remember the two times you paid him $1,000?
"A. No, I don't remember, sir.
*

*

*

*

*

"Q. [The two payments of $1,000 were] to repay the loan, the money
he gave you?
yes.
"A. That is right, to *defray* the loan,
*
*

*

*

"Q. Why did you pay him $1,000?
"A. In order to keep good faith.

on March 28th, 1972, you paid Patty Marino a $1,000, is
"Q.
*
that correct?
"A. I don't remember that, I really don't
"Q. Was it the early part of March, March 28th, 1972?
"A. I don't remember that
"Q. Do you deny paying Patty Marino a $1,000 on March 28th, 1972
with a promise to pay another $1,000 soon after?
"A. I don't remember that
"Q. Do you deny it happening?
"A. I don't remember it sir.
"Q. All right. Isn't it a fact that yesterday you told this grand jury
that you remember that you paid him a $1,000?
"A. Well, why should he give me $4,000. I don't remember that
then."
People v. Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d at 235-36, 385 N.E.2d at 1215-16, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 286.
198 Id. at 235, 385 N.E.2d at 1215, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
199 In New York, criminal contempt, N.Y. PE.ALx LA%w § 215.51 (McKinney
1975), in some circumstances, is closely related to perjury. This is true, for example, in cases in which the contempt is predicated on a false and evasive profession
of an inability to recall or on contradictory responses repeatedly altered. See
note 29 supra. See also People ex rel. Valenti v. McCloskey, 6 N.Y.2d 390, 160
N.E.2d 647, 189 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 534 (1960).
In such cases, the evasive contempt is tantamount to a perjury that is apparent
from the face of the record. That is, "testimony which is so plainly inconsistent,
so manifestly contradictory and so conspicuously unbelievable as to make it apparent
from the face of the record itself that the witness has deliberately concealed the
truth." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Finkel v. McCook, 247 A.D. 57,
63, 286 N.Y.S. 755, 761, aft'd, 271 N.Y. 636, 3 N.E.2d 460, 288 N.Y.S. 409
(1936)).
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cates in New York. 200 Members of a police surveillance team testified in detail before the grand jury that ten months earlier, shortly
after Marquez's release from federal prison, he met Tyler in Manhattan, apparently by prearrangement. The two drove to a nearby
restaurant where they remained for over an hour before leaving
together, Tyler driving Marquez back to his parked car.20 1 When
questioned initially before the grand jury about his relationship
and dealings with Marquez, Tyler stated that he had represented
Marquez several years earlier in a gambling case but since becom20 2
ing a supreme court justice had not communicated with him.
Recalled to the grand jury two months later, Tyler was again
questioned about Marquez. 20 3 On this occasion he corrected his
200 People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d at 254-55, 385 N.E.2d at 1226, 413 N.Y.S.2d

at 297.
2oI
202 Id. at 255, 385 N.E.2d at 1226-27, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
203

The defendant explained at his trial that a discussion he had with his wife
following his earlier appearance had refreshed his recollection. After he recalled
meeting Marquez, the interrogation continued:
"Q. [Y]ou testified before that you saw him on occasion when he was
being transported by federal marshals. You said that was the only time
you'd seen him since you'd become a judge. Is that the occasion you're
talking about?
"A. No, that's not the occasion I'm talking about
"Q. What is the occasion that you're talking about?
"A. I saw him on an occasion when he was with his wife on 58th
Street in Manhattan.
"Q. When was that?
"A. I couldn't fix the dates. Probably somewhere around May. May
of '75, somewhere around there.
"Q. Can you describe that in any more detail, that meeting or encounter or whatever it was on 58th Street?
"A. Yes. It was outside of Patsy's Restaurant I think that's where
it was.
"Q.What were you doing? Were you walking down the street,
driving, in the restaurant? What was"A. I was on my way into Patsy's.
"Q. What happened?
"A. I saw him and his wife.
"Q. What did you do?
"A. We greeted each other, asked him how he was. He asked me
how I was. Asked me how things were getting along, and I asked him the
same thing.
"Q. This was out on the street?
"A. That was on the street. Then they walked into Patsy's and I
walked into Patsy's.
"Q. Were you alone or with anyone else?
"A. I was alone. I was waiting for my daughter.
"Q. What happened after you went into Patsy's?
"A. I think I had a drink.
"Q. Was there a bar there, or did you have it at the table?
"A. Sitting right at the entrance of the door, I had a drink at the
door.
"Q. Did you have a drink alone?
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testimony, stating that he had met Marquez "[p]robably somewhere
around May of '75 . . . outside of Patsy's Restaurant."

204

Tyler

testified further that he entered the restaurant with Marquez, but
stayed only "ten or fifteen minutes" before leaving alone.2 0 5 The
prosecutor asked Tyler about the subject matter of their discussion;
Tyler responded that they had discussed Marquez's "health." 206
Tyler was indicted, tried, and convicted of perjury.
In Pomerantz and Schenkman, the court of appeals found that
the prosecutors interrogated the witnesses in good faith for the
purpose of establishing evidence of antecedent crimes. The prosecutor's aim in Pomerantz was not perjury but "flushing out the
truth." 207 Thus, to jog the witness's memory, the prosecutor re"A. No. He and his wife sat down.
"Q. How long did that take?
"A. About ten or fifteen minutes.
"Q. What happened then?
"A. I got up and left.
"Q. And they remained in the place?
"A. I believe so.

"Q. Did you have a previous arrangement to meet with Mr. Marquez
at that location?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. It was purely chance?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. When you arrived there did you - withdrawn. What did you
discuss during the course of that meeting with Mr. Marquez?
"A. How he was, basically.
"Q. Had he recently come out of prison?
"A. I understood that he had, yes.
"Q. Was that part of the discussion?
"'A. Yes.
"Q. Anything else except his health?
"A. That's all. Health and what he planned to do.
"Q. Did he tell you what he planned to do?
"A. He said he intended to take it easy.
"Q. And that was the extent of the conversation?
"A. In substance.
"Q. Can you remember anything else that was discussed?
"A. No, I can't, because it was just chit-chat.
"Q. Did he discuss with you any matters that were in the courts at
that time?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Did you discuss any of the - did he discuss the fact that the
people in his organization had been arrested?
"A. No, sir."
Id. at 256-58, 385 N.E.2d at 1227-28, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 297-98.
204 Id. at 256, 385 N.E.2d at 1227, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 297-98.
205 Id.

206 Id.

207People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d at 243-44, 385 N.E.2d at 1220, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 290. Interestingly, the prosecutor in his summation admitted wanting
"to trap Joshua Pomerantz." Id. at 249, 385 N.E.2d at 1223, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
294. In justifying this remark, the court of appeals observed: "If indeed a trap
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ferred to Feinberg by name on three different occasions and also
referred by name to the nursing home. 20 8

Further attempts to

stimulate the witness's memory, for example, by mentioning the precise date of the prior meeting or by reading portions of the transcript of the conversation 209 were held to be not required because
"[t]he subject matter of the meeting should have made it memorable [to Pomerantz]." 210 Moreover, "the prosecutor's repetition
and restatement [of questions] provided ample cues to stimulate
defendant's recollection." 211 It would be "unreasonable" to suggest that the defendant's recollection would have improved had
the precise date of the meeting been furnished him. 2 2

"Nor

should the prosecutor be required to confront the defendant with
the recording, lest he conform his testimony to what was already
known and fail to add to the prosecutor's knowledge." 213
Similarly, in Schenkman, the nature of the event that was the
subject of the interrogation was pivotal in the court's assessment of
the prosecutor's motive. Schenkman was an "astute operator" who
dealt frequently with considerable sums of money; it would be
"incredible" that she would not accurately recall the payments to
Rizzo.'2 14 "[O]ne may be sure that the seasoned defendant, because
it would be crucial to her, remembered precisely how and why and
for what she had repaid Rizzo." 215 Although the prosecutor apparently made no reference to the recorded conversation, he was
not obliged to do so because he "gave the defendant ample cues to
stimulate her recollection" by repeating, restating, and elaborating
questions directed to the subject matter of the inquiry.216
The court of appeals, distinguishing Pomerantz and Schenkman, held that Tyler demonstrates "an unmitigated effort to trap
the witness on minor outward details of a single meeting with a
reputed criminal figure." 217 The prosecutor made "no attempt to
establish that the meeting was pertinent to a proper substantive
was set, it was aimed not at perjury, but at flushing out the truth." Id. at 243-44,
385 N.E.2d
at 1220, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
20 8
See note 196 supra.
20 9
Id. at 249, 385 N.E.2d at 1223, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 293-94.
210 Id. at 243, 385 N.E.2d at 1220, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 249, 385 N.E.2d at 1223, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
Id.
214People v. Schenkrman, 46 N.Y.2d at 237-38, 385 N.E.2d at 1217, 413
213

N.Y.S.2d at 287.
215 Id. at 238, 385 N.E.2d at 1217, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
216 Id.
217 People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d at 259-60, 385 N.E.2d at 1229, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 300.
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goal of [the] Grand Jury investigation." 2M8 The meeting, although
"perhaps indiscreet," 219 could easily have been an innocent "chance
encounter." 220 "[A]t no time did the prosecutor, either by repetition, restatement, or elaboration, press defendant into giving a
convincing narrative of what indeed went on at the restaurant." 221
Because the prosecutor made "no palpable effort" to demonstrate
"that the meeting was material to the Grand Jury investigation," 222
false answers relating to "peripheral" and "logistical" details of the
meeting were held insufficient to support a prosecution for perjury.223 Moreover, the prosecutor made no effort to stimulate the
defendant's memory with the information already acquired by the
surveillance team to ascertain whether the witness was genuinely
unable to recall "details of no memorable significance." 224 Because
the intrinsic significance of the event was slight, the prosecutor
should have made a meaningful effort to refresh the witness's recollection. By failing to do so, he demonstrated his "preoccupation
with trapping defendant into committing perjury." 2 2 5
The New York Court of Appeals has taken significant steps
towards providing meaningful and realistic standards for prosecutorial conduct. Nevertheless, the court's attempt to distinguish the
aforementioned cases raises difficult questions. As noted earlier,
the court's principal inquiry is to determine whether the grand
jury conducted an honest investigation to "flush out the truth."
Thus, the court initially evaluates the significance of the event that
is the subject of the interrogation to determine not the extent to
which it was material to the investigation but whether it should
have been "memorable" to the witness. 226 The conversations be218 Id. at 260, 385 N.E.2d at 1229, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
219
220

Id. at 261, 385 N.E.2d at 1230, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
Id. at 260, 385 N.E.2d at 1229, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 300.

221 Id.
222 Id.
223 The court observed that the prosecutor interrogated Tyler "as if he were
conducting only a quiz to test memory or recall." Id.
224 Id. at 260-61, 385 N.E.2d at 1230, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
225 Id. at 262, 385 N.E.2d at 1231, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
226The court seems to be confusing the concept of "materiality" with
"memorability." Initially, the court states: "Nor need materiality be discussed."
Id. at 258, 385 N.E.2d at 1228, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 299. Later in the opinion, however, the court notes that the prosecutor failed to demonstrate "that the meeting
was material," id. at 260, 385 N.E.2d at 1229, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 300, and "evinced
minimal or no interest in establishing the materiality of the meeting," id. The
court goes on to discuss the significance of the meeting in determining whether it
"should have been memorable." Id. at 261, 385 N.E.2d at 1230, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 301. Perhaps the court is saying that although an event may be material as
an abstract matter of law-and interrogation concerning a meeting between a
judge and a reputed mobster is clearly material-it may not be material or "significant" in terms of the witness's ability to remember the event without some
stimulation.
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tween Pomerantz and Feinberg about nursing home fraud and the
conversation between Schenkman and Rizzo about loans were viewed
by the court to be significant and therefore memorable. The conversation between Tyler and Marquez, however, was viewed as
22 7
not memorable.
After subjectively assessing the memorability of a particular
event, the court then decides how vigorously the prosecutor must
stimulate the witness's recall in order to insulate his questioning
from attack as a perjury trap. The prosecutor in Tyler, for example, did not probe sufficiently deeply to demonstrate a good faith
inquiry; in contrast, the prosecutors in Pomerantz and Schenkman
did. This analysis is problematic. If the only proper purpose of
interrogation of a witness before a grand jury is to "flush out the
truth," 228 the prosecutors in all three cases should have been
obliged to provide the witnesses with the information already in
the grand jury's possession in order to stimulate recollection,2 29
and thus increase the scope and value of the witness's testimony.
The court's fear that by doing so the prosecutor might provide the
witness with an opportunity to tailor his testimony probably overestimates a witness's ability to conform testimony to incriminating
or embarrassing evidence, and may also underestimate a prosecutor's
ability to probe the evasion and demonstrate its falsity. Indeed, if
truth is the objective of the investigative questioning, then the
prosecutor is, in most cases, no further from the truth by confront227

One might legitimately question whether a meeting between the reputed
head of one of the largest illegal gambling enterprises in New York and a high
ranking judge is any less memorable than a conversation ten months earlier between a supplier of more than thirty nursing homes and an owner, or a reference
to two $1000 loans by a bail bond agent who regularly deals in huge sums of
money. The conversation between Tyler and Marquez may have been difficult to
remember, although, on its face, a lengthy encounter between a member of the
judiciary already under investigation for other alleged irregularities and a major
"crime figure" just released from prison does not appear totally innocuous or easily
forgettable. In any event, the significance of the meeting or its inconsequentiality
was precisely what the grand jury was investigating and, one would expect, quite
legitimately. Tyler, who had already fabricated the "peripheral" and "logistical"
details of the meeting, was asked no less than eight different times what he and
Marquez had talked about. It is unclear from the court's discussion whether asking
eighteen or one-hundred different questions in varying restatements and repetitions would have made any difference in the result.
To be sure, the prosecutor in Tyler was not as fortunate as the prosecutors in
Pomerantz and Schenkman. He did not have a record of the critical conversation,
nor a witness to provide "memorability" to the event. He could rely on only the
'logistical details" and question the witness on the intrinsic details. Query whether
denials by Pomerantz and Schenkman about the single fact that there had been
a conversation would be sufficient to sustain a perjury prosecution.
228 See note 207 supra.
229 See note 98 supra.
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ing the witness with contradictory information to refresh recollection than he is by the attenuated probe approved by the court in
Pomerantz and Schenkman.
Several important considerations have been addressed by the
New York Court of Appeals. To divine a prosecutor's purposethe critical inquiry-requires an assessment of the nature and significance of the event under investigation, and of the interrogation
techniques used to stimulate the witness's memory. If the event is
deemed significant, the prosecutor is not required to make as
thorough an effort to refresh the witness's recollection as would be
necessary if the event were considered insignificant. If the prosecutor has made no palpable attempt to demonstrate the event's
significance and has failed to provide the witness with sufficient
facts to enable him to testify truthfully, it might be concluded that
the prosecutor's purpose was to extract perjury. The court, however, cautions against application of any "formalistic" rule that
would permit a prosecutor to frame his questions to create the
appearance of a legitimate inquiry.2 30 The court remarked that it
was "concerned with substance, not form," 231 reflecting an appreciation that no precise guidelines can be issued in the complex and
dynamic setting of a grand jury. This is particularly true in light
of the fact that the court's test involves relative judgments about
the significance of an event, its memorability, whether the witness's
memory was stimulated and to what extent, and the interest exhibited by the prosecutor in thoroughly investigating the event.
Returning to the White hypothetical, the event that is the subject of the examination-the telephone conversation with Singerappears much less significant than the conversations in Pomerantz
and Schenkman and no more significant than the meeting in Tyler.
The conversation was not shown to be memorable to White, and
no effort was made to stimulate his memory. As in Tyler, the
prosecutor appeared more interested in catching White in contradictions about details of the conversation with Singer than in interrogating the witness about his knowledge of corruption. Although
it is not entirely clear that White was the victim of a perjury trap,232
apparently such a defense would be successful, under the reasoning
in Tyler.
230 People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d at 250, 385 N.E.2d at 1224, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 294; People v. Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d at 239, 385 N.E.2d at 1218, 413 N.Y.S.2d

at 288.
231

at 294.

People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d at 250, 385 N.E.2d at 1224, 413 N.Y.S.2d

232 In a case somewhat similar to the White-Singer example, a court determined that the grand jury "had a reasonable basis for believing that an effort may
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IV. A PROPOSED TEsT AND

11s IMPLEMENTATION

A. ProsecutorialPurpose
Although the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments place some restraints on the conduct of grand jury
proceedings, 233 the Supreme Court has never reversed a perjury
conviction on the ground that the grand jury proceedings violated
the guarantee of due process. The Court has indicated, however,
that due process, in some circumstances, might mandate reversal of
a perjury conviction. 234 These circumstances would have to be
extreme given the Court's present view of perjury. Insofar as the
grand jury serves its legitimate purposes 23 5-the discovery of past
crimes and the identification of persons to be charged-an act of
perjury by a grand jury witness is rightly viewed as an affront to
the integrity of the truth seeking process. As a consequence, the
Supreme Court has upheld perjury indictments over claims that
the government impermissibly asked questions, theorizing that the
witness has other testimonial options open to him but that "lying
is not one of them." 236
But to the extent that the grand jury is used to serve an illicit
purpose-the prosecutor's contrivance of an act of perjury by a
witness-the act of perjury should not merit that same condemnation. When the prosecutor structures the grand jury proceedings
with the purpose of trapping a grand jury witness in perjury, he
abuses both the perjury sanction and the grand jury. Indeed, one
might say that, in extreme cases, the prosecutor is using the grand
jury process to solicit present crime rather than to investigate
crimes already committed. Unless courts restrain such grand jury
tactics, there is little reason to think that prosecutorial zeal will
curb itself and, consequently, governmental abuses will go
unremedied.
As noted earlier, it would be difficult to label such conduct by
a prosecutor as entrapment in the technical sense, either because
have been made corruptly to influence [judicial proceedings]" and that the grand
jury "could have reasonably believed that each of these defendants had relevant
information." People v. Rao, N.Y.L.J., March 17, 1977, at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.).
The court was unable to conclude that the proceeding "was designed solely, and
for no other valid purpose than to produce perjury." Id.
233
See notes 27 & 28 supra & accompanying text.
234 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 583 (1976) (plurality opinion);
id. 585 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. 609 (Stewart, J., concurring).
235 See text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
236Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969). See notes 50-53 supra
& accompanying text.
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the prosecutor concededly did not put the words in the mouth of
Remington or of Lazaros, for example, or because the traditional
"predisposition" test of Sorrells and Sherman cannot meaningfully
be applied to a perjury trap. Nevertheless, this willful perversion
of the grand jury's legal function surely falls within that category of
discreditable government conduct that, under either the objective
or the due process standard of entrapment, should bar the government from realizing its gains.2

37

The problem is to distinguish

situations in which the prosecutor deliberately induces perjury from
those in which, in the course of an honest and legitimate probe for
information, he discovers an act of perjury on the part of a dishonest witness.
On reflection, and after considering the legal elements of the
perjury trap, three questions emerge. First, what test should be
employed in determining whether a perjury trap was set? Second,
what criteria should be considered in deciding whether this test has
been met? Third, what procedure should be used in making
these determinations? None of these questions is easily answered.
As we have seen, the formulation that courts most often
articulate in attempting to identify a perjury trap is whether the
sole and exclusive purpose of the prosecutor was to extract perjury.238

As one might expect, this test is so restrictive that it affords

virtually no protection at all from prosecutorial abuse. The notion of a "sole and exclusive" purpose is divorced from reality
because investigative grand jury proceedings are inherently dynamic, wide-ranging explorations with frequently unpredictable
results. In these proceedings the prosecutor has a variety of objectives, motives, interests, beliefs, suspicions and competing considerations that might merge inextricably. The requirement of a
singleness of purpose on the prosecutor's part is, therefore, an
unrealistic, and consequently unmanageably subjective standard.
Despite these complexities, some courts have purported to
identify and condemn a prosecutor's "sole and exclusive purpose"
in particular perjury cases. 239 The decisions of these courts invite
criticism precisely because, even in the most blatant cases, legitimate,
237

See notes 76-78 supra & accompanying text.
See note 15 supra & accompanying text. Some courts, however, are reluctant to make any inquiry into the prosecutor's motivation. See, e.g., United
States v. Nickels, 502 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Since the questions were
material to the grand jury's investigation, we doubt that we can inquire into the
motivation for asking them."), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976).
239 E.g., Brown v. United States, 245 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1957); People v.
Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 385 N.E.2d 1224, 413 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1978). See notes
138 & 193 supra.
238
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information-seeking objectives may be hypothesized. Thus, in
Brown v. United States,240 the case most often cited for the application of the "sole and exclusive purpose" rule, a Nebraska grand
jury-a "roving commission"-questioned Brown about a matter so
lacking in relevance that the prosecutor was held to have intended
solely to trap Brown into committing perjury. Even in the circumstances of Brown, however, a court might have found legitimate purposes to coexist with the illicit one. For example, the
court could plausibly have argued that the prosecutor genuinely
sought, and indeed would have welcomed, truthful testimony about
corruption. In short, the "sole and exclusive purpose" rule is
both artificial and subjective, for a court can always discount an
illicit purpose in light of an expansively viewed prosecutorial objective of securing information. In those other procedural contexts in which courts are typically required to examine the prose241
cutor's good faith, the standards are more realistic.
It is necessary at this point to distinguish the perjury trap from
a situation commonly encountered, for example, in investigations
into organized crime. Frequently, a prosecutor, summoning a witness before the grand jury, will expect with some confidence that
the witness will give false answers to the questions put to him. The
prosecutor's expectation that perjury will be committed-a matter
of prosecutorial experience and judgment-is totally distinct from
the prosecutor's active design to cause perjury to be committed. If
the prosecutor's expectation of perjury were a bar, plainly such a
test would hamper grand jury investigations, particularly in cases
in which witnesses whose testimony might aid the investigation are
hostile to the inquiry and could be expected to obstruct the search
for truth. Such witnesses might perjure themselves with impunity,
claiming that the prosecutor called them with the expectation that
they would give false testimony. Further, because a court might
confuse expectation with intent (in the sense that, in theory, one
is deemed to have intended the probable consequences of his act),
the "expectant" prosecutor might be held to have intended the
commission of an act of perjury solely as a result of his reasonable,
and otherwise innocent, anticipation. It might well be that the
prosecutor's reasonable apprehensions will be borne out, but expectation alone is a consideration that should not weigh against
240 245 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1957).
241 See, e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (double jeopardy);
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) (speedy trial); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966) (pretrial publicity); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (pretrial discovery).
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the prosecutor. Nonetheless, one would expect that the anticipation of false testimony would lead a competent prosecutor to probe
the witness's response with greater skill and intensity in order to
ferret out the truth.
Thus, just as the "sole and exclusive purpose" test is overly
artificial, it would be unduly burdensome to bar prosecution if the
prosecutor was found to have any intent-however remote-to elicit
false testimony. Under this test, unless a prosecutor used every
available technique to dissuade a witness from committing perjury-for example, by offering the witness a "last clear chance" to
retract or recant2-2-it might be argued that the prosecutor harbored a design to obtain a perjury conviction and, hence, that the
defendant should go free.
For instance, assume that a grand jury has summoned a witness
suspected of being involved in loansharking activities, and that incriminating evidence in the form of tape recorded conversations
has been introduced before the grand jury. The prosecutor hopes
the witness will testify truthfully but expects that the witness will
refuse to testify or will answer the questions evasively or will perjure himself. In his interrogation of the witness, the prosecutor
does not disclose to the witness the incriminating recordings. To
reveal them, the prosecutor believes, might compromise the investigation. Lurking, no doubt, in the back of the prosecutor's
mind is the thought-and possibly the intention-of trapping the
witness in a lie. If a court later determines that perjury was at
least one probable consequence of calling the witness, and if the
court applies the test postulated, a subsequent perjury prosecution
would be barred. The adverse impact on effective law enforcement would be considerable, and might indeed weaken perjury as
a sanction for false testimony.
B. The Dominant Purpose Test
This examination of two relatively extreme tests does not, of
course, end the inquiry. We have seen that a test that unrealistically
postulates a sole and exclusive prosecutorial purpose affords virtually
242 Retraction or recantation of a false statement is usually an affirmative defense to perjury if it can be demonstrated that such retraction or recantation was
made (1) during the proceeding in which the false statement was made; (2)
before the false statement substantially affected the proceeding, and (3) before it
became manifest that its falsity was or would be exposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d)
(1976); N.Y. PENAL LAw §210.25 (McKinney 1971). But see United States v.
Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937) (holding under the general federal perjury statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976), that a witness who intentionally lies to a grand jury
may not later purge himself by recanting).
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no safeguard from abuse. A test that would set the perjurer free if
the prosecutor harbored any design to catch the witness in such a
crime has equally unacceptable consequences. In order to avoid
these extremes, and to ensure that both individual rights and the
needs of legitimate investigation are accorded proper respect, a more
balanced test might be formulated as follows: If, in light of the
circumstances elaborated below, it could be shown that a prosecutor's overriding or "dominant purpose" is to extract perjury, then
prosecution for that perjury should be barred. While avoiding the
restrictiveness of the exclusive purpose test, this test still requires a
substantial showing that the prosecutor acted in bad faith. Such
a test in no way undermines the utility of the perjury sanction but,
rather, provides a more meaningful and objective standard to evaluate one aspect of due process in the context of grand jury proceedings. The dominant purpose test has, moreover, the added benefit
of being familiar to courts, because it figures in evaluating other
claimed prosecutorial abuses of the grand jury.243 It is an effective
standard, and it is demonstrably well-suited to a claimed perjury
trap, as will be seen presently.
In the application of this dominant purpose test, several important considerations must be isolated: 244 (1) the subject matter
of the grand jury's investigation; (2) the relationship of the witness
to the investigation; (3) the importance of the questions put to the
witness to the subject matter of the investigation; (4) the extent to
which the prosecutor behaves consistently with his standard operating procedures; and (5) whether the methods of interrogation were
reasonably related to bringing out the information sought from
the witness.
The starting point is the nexus between (1) the subject matter
of the investigation and (2) the witness's purported relationship to
the subject matter. This nexus determines the witness's ability to
illuminate areas into which the grand jury is inquiring. Only by
2

43 In United States v. Dardi, 300 F.2d 316, 336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 845 (1964), the court stated: "'It is improper to utilize a Grand Jury for the
sole or dominating purpose of preparing an already pending indictment for trial."'
See also United States v. Doe (Ellsberg), 455 F.2d 1270, 1273 (1st Cir. 1972);
United States v. Kovaleski, 406 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Mich. 1976). In People v.
Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, cert. denied, 426 U.S.
953 (1976), the court inquired into the "primary intent" of the police in conducting a search and seizure. Id. 178-79, 347 N.E.2d at 610, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
244
Theoretically, independent evidence in which a prosecutor directly reveals
his purposes, such as out-of-court statements or internal documents might be available. Most prosecutors, however, could be expected to avoid creating such evidence, particularly those setting perjury traps. Consequently, this form of evidence
of purpose will likely be unavailable.
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addressing such issues can one make a threshold determination (3)
how directly the questions put to the witness relate to the subject
matter of the investigation. If the questions relate directly to the
subject matter of the investigation, at least at this preliminary
juncture, the prosecutor should be deemed to have established a
prima facie showing of good faith. The pivotal question at this
point should be how close a relationship exists between the questions asked of the witness and the subject matter of the inquiry:
Do the questions bear directly and pointedly on the matter under
inquiry, or are they of only marginal significance? If they bear
directly, no further inquiry into the prosecutor's purpose need be
made at this stage; he is clearly executing his official duties. If,
however, the questions are only marginally related to the investigation, one may properly question the prosecutor's motivation for
probing into matters of slight significance.
To be sure, the test proposed above bears some resemblance to
the materiality inquiry in standard perjury prosecutions. 245 Virtually all perjury statutes require the false statement to be "material" in order to secure a conviction. 246 In view of the attenuated
concepts of materiality that have been articulated in the context of
the various federal and state perjury statutes, 247 this requirement is
of little practical value. In addition, the inquiry proposed above
goes beyond the traditional notion of materiality and requires
examination of the likely importance of the prosecutor's questions.
Consequently, questions that would satisfy the materiality standard
of perjury statutes might nonetheless, when considered in conjunction with other circumstances of the case, contribute to an ultimate
finding of prosecutorial bad faith.2 48
245

For a discussion of materiality, see note 97 supra.

See id.
247 E.g., United States v. Percell, 526 F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir. 1975); United
246

States v. Tyrone, 451 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Neff, 212

F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1954). See note 97 supra.
248 The Lazaros case, discussed at text accompanying notes 144-58 supra, provides an example of a situation in which a prosecutor's questions might satisfy the
materiality requirement of perjury statutes, yet be found suspect under the standards

of materiality and importance proposed above.

Although the questions put to

Lazaros were abstractly material-they did concern the subject matter of the

investigation-other considerations raise substantial doubts concerning their actual

importance. Apparently, every person accused by Lazaros had already testified
before the grand jury, denying under oath his accusations. The prosecutor be-

lieved their testimony and the investigation was winding up. Yet, he also knew
that Lazaros would have to repeat his earlier statements made to the government
investigators. Although the Sixth Circuit held that Lazaros's statements were
nonetheless material, the inquiry proposed above casts grave doubts on the prose-

cutor's motivation in such a situation.

In sum, although there was technical per-

jury, its elicitation was probably the product of an improper prosecutorial trap.
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In the White hypothetical, for instance, if the interrogation
had been closely related to the subject matter of the grand jury
probe-corruption and official misconduct-and White's knowledge
of corrupt activities, White's false testimony would almost certainly
justify an indictment for perjury. The questions that were posed,
however, were not likely to uncover White's knowledge of corruption. The questions were only superficially linked to the investigation's subject matter, and could be expected to accomplish little
more than the procurement of an acknowledgment or denial of a
statement that the grand jury knew that he had made. Without a
further showing of importance to the grand jury investigation, the
interrogation appears designed to trap the witness into testimony
that the prosecutor knows can be refuted.
Closely related to the importance of the questions in the
abstract-that is, an assessment of how closely the questions relate
to the subject matter of the investigation-is a consideration of how
they relate to the particular witness. Although a prosecutor's questions may be important on their face, the following hypothetical
demonstrates that further analysis may be needed. Assume that
based on knowledge that White had been associated with X, Y, and
Z more than ten years ago, the prosecutor asks White: "Do you
know X?" "Did you ever speak to Judge Y?" "Did you ever discuss a pending legal case with Z?" Assume further that X, Y, and Z
are now suspected of having engaged in corrupt acts. White's
answers, false or not, would be relatively insignificant if the prosecutor does not suspect that White had any recent contact with the
subjects under investigation. Thus, it may be that the questions
are significant in the abstract, but that this particular witness, as
the prosecutor well knows, cannot provide the grand jury with
meaningful information. The witness may, however, give false
testimony in response to these abstractly important-but concretely
unimportant-questions. 249 Similarly, in a case in which the prosecutor and grand jury are already in possession of the proven answer
to the question-the recorded conversation in the White-Singer
example-there is obviously no prospect that anything the witness
249In

United States v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,

406 U.S. 945 (1972), a grand jury investigating X for illegal interstate gambling
questioned Lococo, who was also implicated in gambling. Lococo denied that
he had spoken to X within the past year although evidence showed that he had
telephoned X a few times during that time. Even though there was no showing of
the relevance of these calls, the court held that the question was material to the
investigation because "Lococo's false statement curbed the flow of information to
the grand jury. We cannot say that his diversion did not tend to influence the
investigation." Id. 1199.
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says about such matters will add new information.2 50 This is not to
suggest that such questions are impermissible-they are frequently
indispensable to an effective and thorough grand jury investigation.
Insofar as such interrogation may lend itself to trickery rather than
to legitimate inquiry, however, such questions should be scrutinized
carefully.
In the above examples, good reason exists to believe that, because the prosecutor did not probe to uncover crime, his questioning was designed to elicit the subsequent perjurious statements. If
a prosecution for perjury follows, the prosecutor should be required
to demonstrate that his questions were asked for a valid reason and
not merely to establish an inconsistency on a matter peripheral to
the investigation. Following up this inquiry, there may or may not
be further elements indicating a perjury trap. For example, indications of a perjury snare might be found in a case in which the
prosecutor, apparently content with a perjury indictment, desists
from any further questioning of the witness. 25 1 The dismissal of a
witness or the termination of a line of inquiry once a perjured statement has been obtained strongly supports a conclusion that genuine
information was not the prosecutor's objective.
Having discussed various aspects of the concept of materiality
in order to discern the prosecutor's dominant purpose, a further
area of inquiry is (4) the extent to which the prosecutor inextricably deviates from ordinary operating procedures. 252 Such behavior
could, of course, take many forms.

If, as is likely, 253 it is standard

practice to advise grand jury witnesses of their rights, deviation
from this custom ought to require explanation. The threat of
contempt, coupled with a failure to advise a grand jury witness of
certain legal protections-for example, his privilege against selfincrimination-would naturally lead many witnesses to speak when
they might otherwise remain silent. It seems self-evident that a
witness unaware of his status in the investigation, uninformed of
his privilege against self-incrimination, and not cognizant of his
right to the assistance of counsel would be more likely to act foolishly or rashly and succumb to the temptation of perjury than
would a witness apprised of his rights and effectively assisted by
254
counsel.
250

See note 160 supra.

251 See, e.g., People v. Davis, 74 A.D.2d 801, 426 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1980).
252 See text accompanying notes 184-87 supra.
253

See note 88 supra.

254

See note 36 supra.
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Similarly, deviation from ordinary practices might take the
form of the expenditure of inordinately large amounts of scarce
prosecutorial time and resources on obtaining a perjury conviction,
which usually would not be a primary concern. If a prosecutor's
behavior deviates markedly from established procedures, and if no
explanation for the unusual actions is offered,2 55 it appears reasonable to consider this, along with other circumstances, in determining the prosecutor's purpose.
An inquiry into the significance of the questions, the importance of the witness's testimony, and the prosecutor's procedures
are of considerable importance in evaluating the prosecutor's dominant purpose. Such considerations, however, are not conclusive.
A court must necessarily examine (5) the methods of interrogation-perhaps the most critical consideration in attempting to uncover the prosecutor's dominant purpose for interrogating the
witness. We have already seen how the prosecutor, under the
guise of a superficially material examination, may seek to elicit
perjury. Just as traditional concepts of materiality may be distorted and misused, 256 so may the manner of questioning. Thus, a
prosecutor seeking to trap a witness into committing perjury may
use arguably ambiguous terms calculated to trick the witness.
Questions like "Do you know A?" "Were you involved with B?"
"Did you discuss C?" seem superficially innocuous. Most courts
would probably find these questions sufficiently unambiguous to
uphold a perjury conviction, 25 7 and, indeed, in most circumstances,
they would be unobjectionable. Such questions, however, would
also be useful to a prosecutor seeking to set a perjury trap. Although sufficiently unambiguous to support a technical perjury
offense, their vagueness is sufficient to afford the prosecutor an
opportunity to trap unwary or careless witnesses.
A prosecutor, in addition to playing on the ambiguity of certain words, might also phrase his questions in misleading ways.
Thus, going back to our example, questions to White involving the
255 This consideration should be examined with considerable care to minimize
interference with the internal affairs of the prosecutor's oflice. It would be disastrous to inhibit innovative or experimental actions by prosecutors. The test proposed above, however, is unlikely to have any chilling effect on prosecutorial
creativity. Presumably, prosecutors adopt unusual courses of action for explainable
reasons or in response to articulable problems. In such cases, a legitimate explanation for the deviation can be made to the court. Only in cases in which the
deviation from standard operating procedures was for the purpose of trapping a
defendant into committing perjury will the prosecutor find it difficult to provide a
legitimate explanation for his unusual behavior.
256
See text accompanying notes 24548 supra.
257 See text accompanying notes 259-63 infra and note 92 supra.
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terms "intervene," "influence," and "fix" do not appear to have
been used to probe for information. Rather, they were being used
to convey a sinister tone to the earlier conversation, to confuse
the witness, and to elicit a denial that the prosecutor would later
argue was uttered intentionally with knowledge of its falsity.
Just as the use of ambiguous terms might be employed to trick
the witness, so might the pattern of questioning. For example,
assume the grand jury has heard evidence that witness A, a judge,
talked with B, an attorney, about a case presently pending before
Judge A in which attorney B represented one of the litigants. The
conversation was indiscreet but far from incriminating. The grand
jury learned that Judge A decided the case in favor of attorney B's
client, and that the decision was arguably inconsistent with law.
In short, the prosecutor suspects a "fix." Aware that he is unable
to prove a substantive violation, a prosecutor looking for perjury
might ask Judge A (1) whether Judge A ever received any gift or
favor from any litigant or his attorney while their case was pending before the judge; (2) whether Judge A ever discussed the receipt of any gift or favor from any litigant or his attorney while
their case was pending before the judge, and (3) whether Judge A
ever had any ex parte discussion with any litigant or his attorney
about a case while it was pending before the judge.
Assume that the prosecutor has no basis for asking questions
I and 2 and knows that the witness can honestly answer in the
negative. In these circumstances, a pattern of narrow, tightly
worded questions followed by a broad, arguably ambiguous question might be misleading. The witness, perhaps lulled into a belief that the prosecutor is probing for a specific type of information,
might be tempted to avoid a potentially embarrassing answer to
the third question.2 58 In this example, that the prosecutor possessed evidence that Judge A had spoken with attorney B strongly
suggests a deliberate design to create a perjury offense. In sum,
the prosecutor's pattern of questioning and the surrounding circumstances will be relevant in determining whether a perjury trap
has been set.
Returning to our hypothetical, in the grand jury interrogation
the prosecutor asked White (1) "Did you tell Singer that he should
get a lawyer who could influence the D.A.?" (2) "Did you tell Singer
that he should get a lawyer who could fix things with the D.A.?"
(3) "Did you tell Singer that your brother could quash things with
258 Of

course, the witness might have answered falsely because he did not

remember the conversation, and the prosecutor did nothing to stimulate his

recollection.

See text accompanying notes 264-68 infra.

1981]

THE "PERJURY TRAP'"

the D.A.?" The prosecutor could have intended that White, confused by the questions but believing that he could properly deny
the statements attributed to him in questions 1 and 2, also might
deny the statement in question 3 after weighing the embarrassment
stemming from an affirmative reply against the risk that his perjury
would be discovered.
The prosecutor's method and pattern of questioning is, of
course, subject to scrutiny in determining whether a perjury offense
was actually committed. Virtually all perjury statutes define perjury as requiring a "knowing" or "willful" false statement. 3 9
Courts have generally interpreted this requirement as prohibiting
perjury convictions based on unduly vague or ambiguous questions: 260 a perjury offense does not lie "where the question is so
vague that the witness is unable to answer with knowledge of its
meaning," 261 or "where the question propounded admits of several
plausible meanings." 262 Yet, the vagueness test, as traditionally
26 3
articulated, has resulted in relatively few acquittals.
The inquiry into the prosecutor's method and pattern of questioning proposed in connection with perjury trap analysis, however,
is not so narrowly limited. Rather, the prosecutor's questions will
be analyzed from the perspective of their likely purpose. Questioning that manifests no intent to "flush out the truth," or to accomplish any other legitimate purpose, would thus contribute to a
finding of prosecutorial bad faith. Similarly, questioning which,
although sufficient to sustain a technical perjury conviction, was
still ambiguous, tricky, or misleading could contribute to the finding of a perjury trap.
An issue related to the prosecutor's use of ambiguous or misleading words or a tricky sequence of questions to trap a witness is
the extent to which the prosecutor must stimulate the recollection
of the witness. Examples of such stimulation include restating
questions, providing cues, and actually confronting the witness with
evidence that contradicts his answers and exposes his perjury. The
extent to which a witness's memory must be stimulated is a difficult
problem. Its resolution may depend on a number of considerations:
the witness's age, intelligence, and facility for recollection; the intrinsic significance or memorability of the event under inquiry, and
239

See note 3 supra.

2 60

See note 92 supra.

261 O'Connor v. United States, 240 F.2d 404, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
262 United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398, 400 (6th Cir. 1967).
263

See cases cited note 92 supra.
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the precision of the questions and their capactiy to effectively convey
to the witness the nature of the information that is being sought.
Thus, mere repetition or restatement of the question might be
meaningless if the question itself is not readily comprehensible to
the witness. With these considerations in mind, the failure of the
prosecutor to stimulate recall or, conversely, his acceptance and
preservation of a perjurious response without further attempts to
probe the answer to determine if the witness is intentionally falsifying, might, in some circumstances, suggest bad faith.
Going back to our example involving White, there is plainly a
"memorability" problem exploited by the prosecutor. The eventa ten-minute conversation between White and Singer-happened
four months earlier and, being a brief talk between a political
leader and a friend, was probably of small significance to White.
The prosecutor asked vague and confusing questions, did nothing
to stimulate White's recollection, and desisted from further questioning after obtaining the denials. The combination of these
circumstances strongly suggests that the prosecutor ambushed White
into perjury.
Whether a prosecutor should be required to refresh the witness's recollection is a question worth considering, especially when
we recall that the objective of a grand jury investigation is a search
for truth. The courts generally agree that the prosecutor has no
duty to lay a foundation before subjecting a witness to indictment
for perjury on account of false responses. 264 Nor do the courts require that the prosecutor actually confront a witness with his prior
statement itself, either through reading from the transcript, playing
the tape recording, or familiarizing him with any other witness's
265
contradicting testimony.
264

See note 98 supra.
See id.
Interestingly, a New York appellate court, in a recent decision reinstating
a dismissed perjury indictment over a "troublesome" claim of a trap, suggested
that the prosecutor should have confronted the witness with the contradictory
information. People v. Steiner, N.Y.LJ.,. Oct. 14, 1980, at 1, col. 6 (App. Div.
Oct. 7, 1980). In Steiner, in the course of a grand jury probe into corruption in
nursing homes, the defendant, an administrative official in one of the homes under
investigation, was summoned as a witness and given immunity. The defendant
conceded that kickbacks had been paid when he was hired, but denied any personal knowledge or involvement in any kickback scheme. Three suppliers testified
some months prior to the defendant's testimony that they had paid kickbacks to
the defendant, such testimony forming the basis for a three count perjury indictment. The appellate division reversed the order of the trial court dismissing the
indictment, finding that the failure of the prosecutors to further inquire of the
defendant about the specific event, however "unaccountable," did not constitute
entrapment "as a matter of law." The court observed: "No reason appears as to
why the prosecutor did not do so. . . . The prosecutor should confront the wit265
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It is a basic rule of evidence that before one may impeach a
witness by use of a prior inconsistent statement, one must first confront the witness with the contents of the statement and the time,
place, and person to whom the statement was purportedly made. 2 8
This rule of evidence is routinely applicable in trials that are adversarial in nature, but is not applicable in nonadversarial grand
jury proceedings.
A primary purpose of both a trial and grand jury proceedings
is to "flush out the truth." From a policy perspective, therefore, it
appears anomalous to countenance less reliable truthseeking proceedings in the grand jury than at trial. Indeed, there would be
good reason to require that ex parte inquisitions without the oversight of a neutral magistrate be subject to more stringent safeguards
than are open, public proceedings before a judge.
With these policy considerations in mind, although the dogma
that a grand jury witness need not be confronted with inconsistent
evidence is of too ancient an origin to be rejected out-of-hand, it
is not inappropriate to consider the prosecutor's attempts to refresh
a witness's recollection in ascertaining his purpose. Even if one
wholeheartedly accepts the traditional rule, there is little, if any,
basis for objecting to such a consideration. Even if it is assumed
to be appropriate in ordinary, legitimate grand jury investigations,
the traditional rule does not, by its terms, purport to apply to
cases in which the grand jury has been subverted and put to an
improper use. Similarly, the rule merely provides that prosecutors
need not confront grand jury witnesses with inconsistent evidence.
It does not say that whenever the prosecutor avails himself of this
protection, his action will be shielded from inquiries into his good
faith and into the witness's due process rights. Thus, if a prosecutor has made little or no real attempt to procure information
from a witness-by refreshing his recollection or otherwise-one
might properly suspect an illegitimate purpose to procure perjury.
Two common justifications for not requiring confrontation of
the grand jury witness with inconsistent evidence are that such disness with the substance of the contradictory information known to the prosecution
in an effort to determine the truth and advance the substantive purpose of investigation." Id. 17, col. 4.
Presumably, because the court determined that the events under investigation
were "memorable," this apparently lessened the prosecutor's obligation to provide
the witness with additional memory stimulation. But, if that is so, then it is unclear
why the court required the prosecutor to probe further. It seems that in this
borderline case, the court was exceedingly dubious about the prosecutor's purpose, but not sufficiently so to find that the purpose "was an attempt to lead (the
defendant) . . . into the box canyon of entrapment." Id.
6
26 See note 98 supra.
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closure might impinge on the secrecy rule and that it might enable
the witness to obstruct the grand jury's inquiry by conforming his
testimony. Neither justification survives close analysis. The
grand jury secrecy rule has little, if any, relevance to the examination of a witness. The requirement that grand jury proceedings
be conducted in secrecy originally arose to protect grand juries
from government intimidation and reprisal.267 Today, however,
the rule is predicated on a number of considerations, notably preventing the escape of the accused; ensuring freedom of grand jury
deliberations; preventing subornation of perjury or tampering with
witnesses; encouraging witnesses to appear before the grand jury
and speak freely without fear of reprisal; and preventing the disclosure of information adverse to an an individual under investigation who has not been indicted. 68 Neither the language nor the
purposes of the secrecy rule are necessarily infringed by confrontation of a grand jury witness with contrary evidence or by a prosecutor's basing his questions on information already before the grand
jury. The prosecutor may, in certain situations, elect not to convey
to the witness matters before the grand jury if, for example, such
disclosure could not be structured so as to avoid compromising the
investigation or a prior witness. This is not to say, however, that
the prosecutor may structure his interrogation in a deliberate attempt to extract perjured testimony, and then claim that the secrecy rule prevents more honest, open, and effective questioning.
With respect to a witness's tailoring of his testimony, we have
noted earlier that the ability of a witness to evade skillful interrogation should not be exaggerated. A witness could probably provide an innocent explanation with respect to outward or minor
details of an event. Thus, questioned about his meeting with a
reputed mobster, Judge Tyler might innocently explain that the
meeting was a chance encounter between former friends and that
they discussed each other's health. If the prosecutor had evidence
of a conversation in which the Judge discussed the fixing of a case,
however, it would be far more difficult for Judge Tyler to provide
an "innocent" explanation. Rather, a skillful examiner should
be able to force the witness to disgorge the truth or, by careful
and probing interrogation, solidify a case of perjury.
26 7

See Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REv. 455 (1965); Note,
The Grand Jury Powers, Procedures and Problems, 9 CoLJm. J.L. & Soc. PaOB.
681, 707-08 (1973).
26 8
See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405 (1959)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,
681-82 n.6 (1958).
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This is not to say that a prosecutor is required to disclose his
entire file to the witness. Assuming that the information in the
prosecutor's or grand jury's possession is relevant to the interrogation and might induce truthful responses, the prosecutor's failure
to confront the witness with such information is one consideration
in assessing his purpose in interrogating the witness. This consideration would be particularly relevant in a case in which the
witness's ability to recall the event is questionable, in which the
significance of the event is slight, or in which the questions are
ambiguous or misleading.
C. Perjury Trap Procedure
Finally, having discussed the considerations that are important
in an application of the proposed dominant purpose test, we should
consider one remaining matter, namely, the procedure by which a
claimed perjury trap should be resolved. Under the majority
formulation of the entrapment rule, the defendant has the burden
at trial of producing evidence in support of his claim of entrapment and, having done so, affirmatively persuading the jury that
he was entrapped. Thus, the defendant must demonstrate that he
"is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking
to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative
activity of its own officials." 269 But under the objective formulation of the rule, as well as under a due process test looking to the
police methods in luring the defendant into crime, the issue of
entrapment would be an appropriate question of law for the court
and not a question of fact for the jury.
Two rationales have been advanced in support of this latter
procedure. The first, articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v.
United States, reflects an overriding concern for the integrity of
the court.
The protections of its own function and the preservation
of the purity of its own temple belongs only to the court.
269 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958); Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 452-53 (1932); N.Y. P NAL LAw §40.05 (McKinney 1971);
LAw 373 (1972). As sugW. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, HANDBooK oNr Cnmws
gested above, see note 60 supra, this procedure poses serious evidentiary consequences for a defendant who seeks to avail himself of the entrapment defense.
Because the issue of predisposition is the controlling question, the defendant's
prior criminal record becomes logically relevant to whether he was predisposed to
commit the crime for which he is being tried. There is the obvious danger, however, that a jury might improperly use the defendant's past criminal conduct on
the substantive issue of guilty notwithstanding a finding of entrapment on the
merits. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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It is the province of the court and of the court alone to
protect itself and the government from such prostitution
of the criminal law. The violation of the principles of
justice by the entrapment of the unwary into crime should
be dealt with by the court no matter by whom or at what
stage of the proceedings the facts are brought to its atten270
tion.
The second rationale, expressed by Justice Frankfurter in Sherman
v. United States, relates to the development of more efficient and
fair police practices.
Equally important is the consideration that a jury verdict,
although it may settle the issue of entrapment in the particular case, cannot give significant guidance for official
conduct for the future. Only the court, through the
gradual evolution of explicit standards in accumulated
precedents, can do this with the degree of certainty that
27 1
the wise administration of criminal justice demands.
As we have seen, however, the majority's "predisposition"
standard is meaningless as a defense to perjury. The issue in the
perjury trap is not whether the defendant was subjectively predisposed to commit perjury but whether the government acted improperly in soliciting the crime. Viewed as such, entrapment would
be a question of law for the court, for the reasons advanced by
Justices Roberts and Frankfurter. First, trapping a witness into
perjury is a "prostitution of the criminal law" 272 and the courts
must protect their integrity from such abuse. Second, only by
condemning such conduct through aborting prosecutions will the
court deter misuse of the prosecutor's power and thereby give
"significant guidance for official conduct in the future." 273
As a question of law, therefore, the claim of entrapment should
properly be submitted to the court prior to trial, either in the form
of a motion to suppress the defendant's grand jury testimony or,
270 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
271 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Apparently, some federal courts, contrary to the Roberts-Frankfurter view, send to
the jury under appropriate instructions the issues of both police conduct and the
defendant's predisposition. See United States v. Anderson, 356 F. Supp. 1311 (D.

N.J. 1973), discussed in Park, supra note 58, at 188.
272 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
273 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

The role of the court in instances of government overreaching in soliciting crime

is quite similar to the court's role in areas of other alleged constitutional violations.

See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (coerced confession); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegal search and seizure).
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alternatively, to dismiss the indictment. In either case, logically
the result would be the same; without the defendant's testimony
there is no evidence upon which to base a perjury charge. Because
the defendant is authorized to have a transcript of his grand jury
testimony before trial,274 he would have some objective basis for
claiming that the prosecutor's overriding purpose was to trap him
into committing perjury. On the basis of the defendant's motion
and the government's response, the court could decide the issue on
the papers or, if necessary, take some sworn testimony at an adver275
sary hearing.
Once the defendant has established prima facie that the prosecutor's dominant purpose in interrogating him was to elicit perjury,
then the burden properly should shift to the government to demonstrate that its dominant purpose was lawful. 270 The government is
in the best position to show the reasons for summoning the defendant as a witness and for interrogating him in the manner being
challenged. Moreover, to require the government to demonstrate
fairness and honesty would serve as an additional safeguard to protect the integrity of the grand jury and the due process rights of
witnesses. Like the exclusionary rule was intended to be,277 the
proposed test for the perjury trap and its procedures for enforcement should become largely a prophylactic guide to curb prosecutorial abuses. The proposed test would furnish the courts with
a clear yet flexible standard to replace the current tangle of confused legal doctrine.
CONCLUSION

From the abusive prosecutorial methods condemned by
Learned Hand in the red-menace era to today's aggressive use of
the grand jury to uncover white-collar, organized, and official crime,
the courts have only sparingly addressed the problem of the perjury
trap. This might be the case because perjury is considered so obnoxious to our system of justice that the courts are naturally reluctant to develop a new doctrine to relieve a defendant of his
willfully false testimony. Added to this consideration is the specu274 See, e.g., FED. R. Cnmn.
27

P. 16(a)(1)(A).

5 For example, such a hearing was conducted in United States v. Lazaros,

480 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1973).
276 In United States v. Kovaleski, 406 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Mich. 1976), the
court placed the burden on the government to demonstrate that its dominant purpose in calling the witness before the grand jury was not to gather evidence for
use in a pending trial.
2 77
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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lative nature of the claim, difficult of proof, that the prosecutor's
purpose was to extract perjury. As we have seen, however, discussing this problem directly illuminates the secret and generally misunderstood nature of grand jury proceedings, and the prosecutor's
role in investigating crime. Particularly today, when prosecutors
are energetically using grand juries as law enforcement adjuncts,
the courts must be increasingly attentive to such proceedings to
ensure that the enormous power vested in prosecutors and grand
juries does not become a "tool of tyranny."
With respect to the hypothetical case of witness White, I think
it is clear that the prosecutor's dominant purpose in summoning
and interrogating White was to elicit perjury. Under the broad,
traditional concepts of materiality, the questions put to White were
theoretically material to the investigation because they might have
influenced the tribunal to take or desist from taking action. Under
the notion of importance proposed above, however, the questions
were of marginal significance. The grand jury already knew the
answers, there was no specific claim of influence peddling that the
grand jury was investigating, and it is highly conjectural that
the improper suggestions by White had any meaningful relationship
to substantive crime. Further, one would expect that most prosecutors, rather than being content with cursory false responses, would
have probed further beyond the falsehood in order to bring out
the truth. The prosecutor made no effort to do this. He wanted
a perjury indictment.
In conclusion, one is reminded of an ex parte examination by
an attorney general of a witness implicated in a crime considered
quite serious by the government. The interrogator, shifting focus
from the main subject of the inquiry, perhaps to lay a foundation
for a perjury charge, began to ask: "Do you know one John
Wharton?" "How long?" "Do you know Edmund Chillington?"
"How long?" The witness replied:
Why do you ask me all these questions?
pertinent .

.

.

These are (not)

. I am not willing to answer any more of

these questions, because I see you go about by this examination to ensnare me.
278
The tribunal was the Star Chamber.

278 Trial of Lilburn & Wharton, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315, 1318 (1637).

